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ABSTRACT
We test the hypothesis that product market shocks to less-visible text-
based industry peers can explain momentum and long-term reversals. We
examine industry peer firms identified through common product text and focus
on less-visible industry peers that do not share common SIC codes. Shocks
to less visible peers generate economically large momentum profits, and are
stronger than own-firm momentum variables. More visible traditional SIC-
based peers generate only small, short-lived momentum profits. Subsequent
long-term reversals only occur when the return-differential between more and
less visible peers becomes large. Our findings suggest that momentum is driven
by inattention to less visible horizontal peers.
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Since Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) (JT) reported the momentum anomaly, a
large literature documented the magnitude of momentum, its pervasiveness in many
settings,1 and its potential explanations. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) and Je-
gadeesh and Titman (2011) document momentum’s continued robustness in more
recent years. Yet scholars continue to disagree regarding the causes of momentum.
In their recent review, Jegadeesh and Titman (2011) state that “financial economists
are far from reaching a consensus on what generates momentum profits, making this
an interesting area for future research”. We focus on this central issue, and examine
the role of horizontal industry links with varying degrees of visibility to investors.
Using less visible industry peer firms, we find that industry momentum profits
are significant and 2-3x larger than momentum based on own-firm returns. These
momentum profits slowly reverse over three year horizons, especially when less visible
peer returns outpaced those of more visible peers. Most relevant to our paper are ear-
lier contributions by Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) (MG), Hong and Stein (1999)
and Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). MG propose that industry momentum is
a key driver of firm-level momentum. Hong and Stein (1999) and Barberis, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1998) suggest that inattention or slow-moving information might also
be a key driver of momentum. Our results are consistent with inattention-driven
slow moving information following industry shocks triggering momentum profits in
localized product markets.
Our results support the following interpretation of momentum profit cycles. Ini-
tially, the market underreacts to large shocks to economically linked firms. This
underreaction is more severe when economic links between the shocked firms are less
visible. These momentum returns partially reverse over three years, but only when
the average return of less visible industry peers outpaces the average return of more
visible industry peers. This for example can occur when investors trade based on
1Rouwenhorst (1998) and Rouwenhorst (1999) further show that momentum exists around the
world, and Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer, and Swaminathan (2005) show that it also spills over into bond
markets.
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simple price-change strategies alone, as modeled by Hong and Stein (1999).
Our findings run counter, in part, to recent evidence in the literature. For ex-
ample, MG’s conclusion that industry momentum matters was called into question
by Grundy and Martin (2001) (GM), who show that industry momentum is not ro-
bust to the bid-ask bounce, and to lagging the portfolio formation period by one
month. To underscore this point, Jegadeesh and Titman (2011) highlight GM’s find-
ings in their recent review and conclude that industry momentum cannot explain
the momentum anomaly. The authors conclude that momentum profits likely “arise
because of a delayed reaction to firm-specific information”. The conclusion in the
literature that industry momentum matters little is based on using highly visible
traditional SIC-based industry links. We show that this long-standing conclusion is
reversed when less visible text-based industry links are used to re-test the industry
momentum hypothesis. In particular, own-firm momentum is less important once
we control for less visible industry momentum. Our revised conclusion is robust to
the GM critique.
Our conclusion is that momentum due to less visible text-based industry links is
more important than both own-firm momentum, and momentum due to more visible
SIC-based industry links. Our findings thus support the growing consensus among
some scholars (see for example Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), Hong and Stein
(1999), Jegadeesh and Titman (2011)) that market inefficiencies such as inattention
likely play a strong role in generating momentum. Our findings also suggest that
systematic risk models likely cannot explain momentum.2
Recent work by Cohen and Frazzini (2008) and Menzley and Ozbas (2010) sug-
2Systematic risk models, which require transparency for equilibrium pricing, predict that links
with more visibility should generate stronger risk premia. Investors need to be aware of risk loadings
in order to price them in equilibrium. Risk models also require that systematic shocks are pervasive
and difficult to diversify. In conflict with these predictions, we instead find that less visible links
matter more than highly visible links, and we also find that momentum is most priced when shocks
are localized, unrelated to risk factors, and thus easier to diversify. Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003)
also suggest that systematic risk likely cannot explain momentum through a different test (the
absence of a business cycle effect).
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gests that inattention also plays a role in generating predictable returns following
shocks to vertically linked firms. We focus on horizontal industry shocks and not
vertical shocks, and our objective is to address the industry momentum literature.
Controls for vertical shocks do not materially affect our results. Furthermore, only
our less visible horizontal industry shocks, and not vertical shocks, can explain own-
firm momentum and ex post reversals. The finding that vertical and horizontal peers
contain distinct information is expected as horizontal economic links overlap little
with vertical links, as reported in Hoberg and Phillips (2015).
We also assess the extent to which peer shocks transmit slowly. We find that SIC
peer shocks (which are highly visible) transmit quickly within just two months. In
contrast, shocks to TNIC peers (which are less visible as they were not publicized
during our sample) predict subsequent returns up to twelve months. For the standard
one-year momentum horizon, neither own-firm momentum nor SIC-peer momentum
remains statistically significant when less visible TNIC peer momentum variables are
included in standard Fama-Macbeth return regressions.
Our results are consistent with the momentum literature in terms of the duration
of momentum profits being roughly 12 months. They are also consistent with the
long-term reversals literature, as we find that long-term TNIC momentum reversals
at 36 month horizons. These long horizons explain why our results are not driven
by the existing short-horizon finding that large firm returns lead small firm returns
especially within-industry (see Hou (2007)). Moreover, our results are robust to
controlling for lagged return variables used in Hou (2007), including lagged return
variables based on larger firms.
The visibility channel predicts that momentum should be stronger following
shocks to specific peers that are less visible to the investment community. Espe-
cially following the publication of MG, SIC peers were highly visible to investors.
SIC peers were also widely reported in financial databases, financial reports, regula-
tory disclosures and online data resources. However, TNIC peer data was not widely
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distributed during our sample and the first paper illustrating TNIC peers (Hoberg
and Phillips (2010a)) was published late in our sample.3 Because TNIC and SIC
measure the same primitive of horizontal relatedness, we consider TNIC peers that
are not SIC peers to examine the role of visibility. For each firm, we compute “dis-
parity” as the fraction of TNIC peers that are not also SIC peers. We predict and
find that shocks to TNIC peers that are not SIC peers, and shocks in high disparity
product markets, generate the strongest momentum returns.
Further supporting a role for inattention, our results for TNIC momentum are
stronger when fewer mutual funds jointly own the economically linked firms in a
given TNIC industry. This test, first used by Cohen and Frazzini (2008) to examine
customer-supplier links, identifies a more specific mechanism for inattention. Our
results suggest that momentum is stronger when fewer professional investors (mutual
fund managers) are paying attention to our less-visible economically linked firms, as
they are not in their portfolios.
Under the inattention hypothesis, a further prediction is that highly visible sys-
tematic shocks should decay more quickly than idiosyncratic shocks, which are lo-
calized and less visible. Alternative risk-based theories would predict that returns
should be more linked to systematic shocks. We find that only idiosyncratic shocks
transmit slowly and generate momentum. These findings are consistent with inat-
tention and not systematic risk-based explanations.
The spatial nature of TNIC industries allows us to examine if momentum is
related to the breadth of various shocks. We define broad shocks as those that
impact a larger set of related firms that are more distant in the product market
space, whereas localized shocks affect only a small number of proximate firms. We
find that local TNIC peers calibrated to be as fine as the SIC-4 classification generate
strong momentum returns, as do TNIC peers that are calibrated to be as fine as the
3Publication dates of academic articles pertaining to predictable stock returns are relevant, as
Mclean and Pontiff (2014) find evidence that anomalies attenuate after such publication, perhaps
due to increased attention.
4
SIC-3 network. However, broader TNIC peers, calibrated to be as coarse as the
SIC-2 industry network do not generate additional momentum profits. The result
is that only 2% of all firm pairs are needed to explain industry momentum, further
suggesting momentum is idiosyncratic and localized in the product market. This is
further in conflict with systematic risk-based explanations.
We examine various momentum horizon variables to further assess the findings
of JT and MG, and to test for ex-post reversals as in Debondt and Thaler (1985).
Using the standard 11-month momentum horizon, we find that neither own-firm
momentum, nor SIC-peer momentum, is statistically significant when the less visible
TNIC peer momentum variables are included in standard Fama-Macbeth return
regressions. Moreover, the economic magnitude of TNIC peer momentum profits is
considerably larger. Our results are also strong for six month horizons.
Hong and Stein (1999) and Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) predict that
momentum profits eventually reverse when excessive trend chasing drives prices be-
yond fundamentals (overreaction). We find such reversals for 36 month horizons, and
further examine their foundations. Our earlier findings suggest that the market inef-
ficiently prices shocks to less visible peers, but efficiently prices shocks to more visible
peers. Hence we measure overreaction by examining the extent to which less visible
peers have more extreme reactions relative to more efficiently priced high visibility
peers. We sort firms into quintiles based on the ratio of past three-year cumulative
returns of less visible peers to that of more visible SIC-based peers and find that
reversals only occur when this ratio becomes high, consistent with overreaction to
less visible peer returns following episodes of momentum.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses the related literature and
hypotheses, and Section II describes our data and methods. In Section III, we
present summary statistics and results regarding comovement and short-term lagged
information dissemination. Section IV considers long-term momentum and Section
V examines long-term reversals. Section VI concludes.
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I Hypotheses
In this section, we formalize our predictions through four central hypotheses. Our
predictions match those of the theoretical models by Hong and Stein (1999) and
Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). However, we further predict that the specific
mechanism driving inattention momentum is less visible industry links through which
large price shocks need to propagate.
Hypothesis H1: Industry momentum arises from underreaction to shocks af-
fecting groups of peer firms with less-visible economic links.
Hypothesis H2: Past returns of less visible industry peers will be stronger than
the past returns of highly visible peers in simultaneous regressions predicting future
returns. Momentum profits from less visible peer shocks should also be economically
larger than those from highly visible peers shocks.
Hypothesis H3: Momentum profits should be largest following idiosyncratic
shocks, given investors pay less attention to these shocks. Profits should be smaller
following more visible systematic shocks.
Hypothesis H4: At longer horizons, as the market corrects initial underre-
action, long-term reversals should only occur in subsamples where the cumulative
return differential between less visible and more visible industry peers becomes high.
Hypotheses H1 to H3 are direct implications of inattention to economic shocks to
economically related firms. The intuition behind H4 is that longer-term inattention
to the same group of peers that initially led to underreaction can lead to subsequent
overreaction as inattention impairs the market’s ability to determine when the shock
has fully transmitted. This logic is consistent for example with that of the model
in Hong and Stein (1999). We test hypotheses H1 to H3 using horizons up to one
year. We then examine H4 using longer horizons up to three years. Our use of less
visible TNIC peers and highly visible SIC peers that measure the same fundamental
concept of industry relatedness, but with different levels of visibility to investors,
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provides a way to examine these hypotheses.
II Data and Methods
The methodology we use to extract 10-K text follows Hoberg and Phillips (2015). The
first step is to use web crawling and text parsing algorithms to construct a database
of business descriptions from 10-K annual filings from the SEC Edgar website from
1996 to 2011. We search the Edgar database for filings that appear as “10-K,”
“10-K405,” “10-KSB,” or “10-KSB40.” The business descriptions appear as Item 1
or Item 1A in most 10-Ks. The document is then processed using APL to extract
the business description text and the company identifier, CIK. Business descriptions
are legally required to be accurate, as Item 101 of Regulation S-K requires firms to
describe the significant products they offer, and these descriptions must be updated
and representative of the current fiscal year of the 10-K.
We use the Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS) SEC Analytics product to
map each SEC CIK to its COMPUSTAT gvkey on a historical basis. We require
that each firm has a valid link from the 10-K CIK to the CRSP/Compustat merged
database, and it must also have a valid CRSP permno in order to remain in our
database. Our focus is therefore on publicly traded firms in the CRSP database.
Our primary database of monthly firm returns is thus based on the CRSP monthly
returns database. Because our 10-K data begins with fiscal years ending in 1996, after
using the lag structure advocated in Davis, Fama, and French (2000), our starting
point is the CRSP monthly returns database beginning in July 1997 and ending in
December 2012.
A Asset Pricing Variables
We construct size and book to market ratio variables following Davis, Fama, and
French (2000) and Fama and French (1992). Market size is the natural log of the
7
CRSP market cap. Following the lag convention in the literature, we use size variables
from each June, and apply them to the monthly panel to use to predict returns in
the following one year interval from July to June.
The book-to-market ratio is based on CRSP and Compustat variables. The
numerator, the book value of equity, is based on the accounting variables from fiscal
years ending in each calendar year (see Davis, Fama, and French (2000)) for details).
We divide each book value of equity by the CRSP market value of equity prevailing
at the end of December of the given calendar year. We then compute the log book to
market ratio as the natural log of the book value of equity from Compustat divided
by the CRSP market value of equity. Following standard lags used in the literature,
this value is then applied to the monthly panel to predict returns for the one year
window beginning in July of the following year until June one year later.
For each firm, we compute our momentum variable as the stock return during
the eleven month period beginning in month t − 12 relative to the given monthly
observation to be predicted, and ending in month t − 2. This lag structure that
avoids month t − 1 is intended to avoid contamination from microstructure effects,
such as the well-known one-month reversal effect.
After requiring that adequate data exist to compute the aforementioned asset
pricing control variables, and requiring valid return data in CRSP and also a valid
link to 10-K data from Edgar, our final sample has 811,672 observations.
B Industry Momentum Variables
The variables we focus on are based on the return of peer firms residing in related
product markets relative to a given firm (henceforth the focal firm). The central
question is whether shocks to the related firms generates comovement, and more
interesting, if the shocks disseminate slowly and thus entail prolonged return pre-
dictability and subsequent reversals.
8
We consider simultaneously-measured monthly returns of product market peers.
For text-based industries, we compute the equal weighted average of the simultane-
ous monthly stock returns of TNIC industry peers (excluding the focal firm itself).
Similarly, for traditional SIC-3 industry returns, we compute the average simultane-
ous monthly stock return of SIC-3 industry peers (excluding the focal firm itself).
Our central prediction regarding simultaneous returns is that the return of the focal
firm will comove more with the return of its product market peers when the peers are
less visible. Because they were not publicized during our sample, text-based industry
peers are less visible than SIC peers, which were widely available to investors during
our sample.
The more interesting question is whether the implied price impact of product
market shocks is disseminated with delay. In our first series of tests, we focus on the
monthly return of TNIC and SIC peers as independent variables, and we examine
their relationship with ex-post own firm returns using various lags. This test assesses
whether lagged monthly returns from more and less visible product market peers
predicts monthly ex-post focal firm returns.
In a second series of tests, we expand the holding period horizon of the ex-ante
peer firm returns to 3, 6, 12, 24, and 36 months. The prediction is that if information
from product market shocks is disseminated with delay, then these extended horizon
variables should be particularly strong predictors of ex-post focal firm returns given
that they aggregate information in product market shocks over longer periods of
time. Moreover, at the longest horizons, we would expect to see evidence of rever-
sals, especially in subsamples where less visible to highly visible return differentials
develop, as predicted by Hypothesis H4.
C Industry Disparity
We also consider more refined subsamples based on the data structures generated
by text-based industries. In particular, we consider “disparity”, which we define as
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the extent to which a given focal firm’s less visible TNIC peers disagree with highly
visible SIC peers. In particular, disparity is equal to one minus the ratio of total
sales of peers in the intersection of TNIC-3 and SIC-3 industry peer groups, divided
by the total combined sales of peers in the union of TNIC-3 and SIC-3 peer groups
overall. The use of sales weights is based on the assumption that the price of a focal
firm is more likely to be influenced by larger rivals than smaller rivals.
A firm in an industry with a high degree of disparity is thus in an industry with
a large number of big TNIC peers that are not SIC-3 peers and vice-a-versa. Our
prediction is that the dissemination of information should be particularly lagged when
disparity is high, as this would indicate that less visible links are not replicated by the
highly visible links, leaving fewer alternative channels for information dissemination
for these links.
D Systematic and Idiosyncratic Risk
We also consider whether shocks to peers are idiosyncratic of systematic in nature.
We thus begin with a simple decomposition of any firm’s monthly return into a
systematic and an idiosyncratic component. We use daily stock return data to im-
plement this decomposition for each monthly stock return of each firm in each month.
Using daily excess stock returns as the dependent variable, we regress these returns
onto the daily stock returns of the market factor, HML, SMB, and UMD.4
The predicted value from this regression is the systematic return. We use the
geometric return formulation to aggregate the systematic daily returns to a database
of monthly systematic stock returns for each firm in each month. We define the
idiosyncratic component of returns as the monthly excess stock return minus the
systematic excess stock return in the same month. We thus have excess stock returns,
systematic stock returns, and idiosyncratic stock returns for each firm in each month.
4We thank Ken French for providing the daily factor returns on his website.
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III Return Comovement
In this section, we present summary statistics and examine the short-term relation-
ship between focal firm returns and the returns of various peers. Table I presents
summary statistics for our firm-month observations from July 1997 to December
2013. The average monthly return in our sample is 0.9% with a standard deviation
of 17.2%. The average monthly return of our various peer groups is analogous, but
the standard deviation of these variables is lower (8.8% and 10.1%). This result is
due to the fact that these peer return variables are averages, which reduces the level
of variation relative to that of individual firms.
[Insert Table I Here]
Panel D presents Pearson correlations. Not surprisingly, the book to market
ratio and the firm size variables are not highly correlated with any of the momentum
variables. The table also shows that own-firm returns are 44.8% correlated with
the return of TNIC peers, and just 38.2% correlated with SIC-3 peers, indicating
that TNIC industries are more informative. The TNIC and SIC-3 peers are also
69.4% mutually correlated, indicating that they also have some common information.
Despite the information overlap, our later tests will show that both have distinct
signals, and TNIC momentum subsumes SIC-3 momentum.
Our short-term tests involve assessing the extent to which focal firm monthly
returns comove with TNIC and SIC-3 peer returns, and also whether information
in these variables disseminates gradually. We consider Fama-MacBeth regressions
where the dependent variable is the month t return of the focal firm. In simultaneous
return tests, we consider specifications in which the return of the TNIC peers and
SIC-3 peers is the key RHS variable. We also include controls for the log book to
market ratio, log firm size, and lagged own-firm return from month t− 12 to t− 2.
[Insert Table II Here]
Panel A of Table II displays the results. All RHS variables are standardized
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to have unit standard deviation prior to running the regressions so that coefficient
magnitudes can be directly compared. When included together in row (1), we find
that the TNIC peer return generates larger price impact (coefficient 0.030) than
does the SIC-3 peer return (coefficient 0.024). The magnitudes indicate that a one
standard deviation shift in TNIC peers implies a return impact of 3% on the focal
firm. In rows (2) and (3), we run analogous regressions with each variable excluded
from the model. The results suggest that both variables have greater price impact
when regressed alone, consistent with there being some overlap in the two variables.
However, comparisons of the three columns indicate that the independent signal in
TNIC-3 industries is more robust and has greater overall impact.
In Panel B of Table II, we consider one to three month lags to the specification in
row (1), which allows us to examine if information disseminates slowly (we consider
longer horizons in the next section). Row (4) is identical to row (1) for comparison.
Row (2) has a one month lag and shows that a one standard deviation shock to
lagged TNIC peers results in a 0.7% return for the focal firm, and a similar shift
in SIC-3 peers generates a 0.4% return. However, when we extend the lag to three
months as in row (7), we find that only TNIC peers continue to significantly predict
focal firm returns. A one standard deviation shock to TNIC peer returns results in a
0.3% monthly return for the focal firm. An initial conclusion is that information in
TNIC peers disseminates slower than information in SIC-3 peers. Our later results
for longer horizons will reinforce this result, and tests for mechanisms will show that
this is due to the low visibility of TNIC peers compared to SIC-3 peers during our
sample.
In Online Appendix Table A1, we reconsider the regressions in Panel B of Table II
separately for firms with above and below median industry disparity. Our prediction
is that information should disseminate more slowly for TNIC shocks to firms with
high industry disparity, as less visible TNIC shocks in these markets have no direct
channel to transmit to the focal firm directly. Table A1 confirms that information
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disseminates more slowly when industries have high disparity. When disparity is
low, peer shocks disseminate quickly in just one month. When disparity is high,
shocks continue to disseminate over time. Tests of longer-term momentum in the
next section will further confirm this link to industry disparity at longer horizons.
In Online Appendix Table A2, we reconsider these regressions separately for
idiosyncratic and systematic risk (our decomposition is explained in the previous
section). As we hypothesize a strong role for in inattention, our prediction is that
returns should only disseminate slowly for idiosyncratic peer shocks. Alternative
theories of systematic risk would predict that only the systematic component should
matter. Table A2 shows that although both idiosyncratic and systematic shocks
are economically large and generate simultaneous comovement, only idiosyncratic
shocks appear to disseminate slowly. Systematic shocks disseminate in just one
month, whereas idiosyncratic shocks continue to disseminate over time. Our longer
horizons tests in the next section will further confirm this finding.
IV Momentum Variables
In this section, we consider momentum variables with varying horizons and test the
hypothesis that momentum might be partially explained by the slow dissemination
of product market shocks. We consider standard Fama-MacBeth regressions where
the dependent variable is the own-firm month t excess stock return. In addition to
the book to market and size control, we consider six variables based on past returns.
Three of the variables are simply returns from the past one-month, which relate to
the one-month reversal anomaly for own-firm returns. The other three are returns
over the 11 month period beginning in month t− 12 and ending in month t− 2. For
each of the two horizons, we consider own-firm return, the return of SIC-3 peers,
and the return of TNIC peers. The existing momentum anomaly is characterized by
the role of the past own-firm stock return from month t− 12 to t− 2. Analogously,
industry momentum as in Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) is characterized by the
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SIC-3 peer return during the same horizon. Our central test is whether less visible
text-based peer returns from the same horizon contribute information over and above
SIC-based variables.
[Insert Table III Here]
We test this hypothesis in Table III for the entire sample (Panel A) and for
the sample ending in December 2007, which excludes the financial crisis and the
subsequent recovery period. The results for the longer-horizon momentum variables
illustrate that when own-firm and SIC-3 based momentum variables are included
alone, they are mainly significant in the pre-crisis period. However, when they are
included alongside the less visible TNIC peers, neither own firm momentum, nor SIC-
3 momentum, remains significant. Also relevant is the fact that TNIC momentum is
significant in both samples, including the sample that includes the financial crisis. We
conclude that TNIC momentum variables are the most robust momentum variables
in both samples. These findings, when considered along with the results of the last
section, support the conclusion that shocks to related product market links that are
less visible can explain a large fraction of the momentum anomaly.
The table also shows that all three one-month momentum variables contain
unique information. These results are less important than the longer-horizon vari-
ables because it is more difficult to trade on one-month returns due to transaction
costs. We also note that the own-firm one month past return is negative, whereas
both the SIC-3 and the TNIC one month returns are positive. These results are con-
sistent with Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) who find similar results. In all, we pri-
marily include the one month variables as separate controls, and further assessment
of these variables is outside the scope of this study, which focuses on longer-horizons.
A Vertical Links
Two existing studies document that shocks to vertical peers can also predict future
returns. Cohen and Frazzini (2008) consider vertical links using disclosed customer
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links from the Compustat segment tapes and Menzley and Ozbas (2010) consider
both upstream and downstream vertical links using the input-output tables from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Our objective is to examine if information in our
horizontal links is distinct from information in these vertical links. Because Hoberg
and Phillips (2015) document that TNIC links overlap very little with vertical links,
we predict that information in both sets of links should be highly distinct.
To construct controls for vertical links, we follow the procedures used in both
aforementioned studies. For customer links, we use the Compustat segment files,
and we lag information on major customers 6 months to avoid look-ahead bias.
For a given firm, we compute the average return of its major customers using both
the standard 11 month window we use for TNIC momentum (t − 2 to t − 12) and
separately for the most recent month return (t − 1). For IO-table vertical peer
returns, we use the 1997 and 2002 Input-Output tables given that we predict returns
from July 1997 and forward. In all cases, we use ex-ante measurable economic links
from these files. We then compute the average returns separately for both upstream
industries and downstream industries for the same two return windows. We then
compute the average of the upstream and downstream peer returns for both return
windows. We then reconsider the regressions in Table III with these four additional
control variables included (two horizons, two types of vertical links).
[Insert Table IV Here]
The results are displayed in Table IV. The table shows that our TNIC-3 past
return variables are highly robust to including the four vertical link variables. Com-
paring row (6) to row (1), or row (12) row (7), suggests that our results in fact
become marginally stronger when the controls are added. We thus conclude that
information in our horizontal economic links overlaps little with information in the
vertical link variables. We also note that we are able to replicate the main results
in both of these previous studies. For example, the shock to customers is positive
and significant in most specifications, although it loses significance when the TNIC-3
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momentum variable is included in Panel B. We also find that the IO Table vertical
return is positive and significant at the shorter one-month horizon.
Finally, we note that we standardize all RHS variables in the regression to have
a zero mean and a unit variance prior to running the regressions in Table IV. Hence
the coefficients can be compared and conclusions can be drawn regarding relative
economic magnitudes. The table shows that the coefficients for TNIC-3 momentum
are generally at least four times as large as are the vertical peer coefficients for the
longer 11 month horizon, which is the standard horizon used to assess momentum.
We conclude that both vertical and horizontal shocks can independently predict
returns, although the potential of the horizontal peer shocks to explain momentum
exceeds that of the vertical peer shocks.
B Various Horizons
We next consider variations in the horizon of the momentum variables. In particular,
we consider three-month past returns (from t − 4 to t − 2), six-month past returns
(from t− 7 to t− 2), eleven month past returns (from t− 12 to t− 2) and 24 month
past returns (from t − 25 to t − 2). We use the Fama-MacBeth regressions as in
Table III, but with separate consideration for each horizon. We also consider the full
sample, and a subsample ending in December 2007 to exclude the financial crisis.
Results are presented in Table V.
[Insert Table V Here]
The results in Panel A of Table V for the full sample show that TNIC momentum
variables are highly significant at the three, six, and 11 month horizons, but not at the
longer 24 month horizon. This pattern is consistent with existing evidence regarding
the momentum anomaly. Perhaps most interesting, the table also shows that none
of the other momentum variables (own firm past return or SIC-3 peer past return)
is significant when the TNIC past returns are included at any horizon other than
the shortest 3 month horizon. In particular, SIC-3 peer returns are significant at the
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three month horizon but not beyond.
We conclude that longer-term momentum is best explained by lagged dissemina-
tion of product market shocks to less visible peers. The results for the SIC-3 peers,
which are more visible, are smaller in magnitude and shorter-lived.
The coefficients we report are standardized prior to running the regressions.
Hence, the coefficient magnitudes can be compared. Even though SIC-3 peer re-
turns significantly predict ex-post own-firm returns at the three month horizon, the
economic impact of these peers (coefficient of 0.002) is considerably less than that of
the TNIC peers at the same horizon (0.007). Because the impact of SIC-3 peers is
smaller and shorter-lived, it is likely that returns attributable to this variable might
not entail profitable trading strategies due to the high portfolio turnover needed to
pursue shorter-lived anomalies. In contrast, the longer-lived TNIC peer shocks are
more likely to entail potential trading profits. This indicates an intuitive relationship
between the degree of visibility and trading profits, as the market more efficiently
prices shocks to more visible peers.
The profits attributable to TNIC peers are also robust during the broader sample
that includes the financial crisis. This is expected under the hypothesis that momen-
tum is not due to systematic risk. This robustness can thus be seen as additional
evidence against a systematic risk based interpretation of momentum.
C Product Market Breadth
Does momentum arise from localized shocks in the product market space (we refer to
such shocks as “local”), or broader shocks affecting larger numbers of product market
peers (we refer to such shocks as “broad”)? We note the use of terms like “local”
and “broad” are intended to have a spatial interpretation as the TNIC industry
classification can be viewed as a product market space shaped as a high dimensional
sphere (see Hoberg and Phillips (2015)). Local shocks are those affecting only a
small region of the space around a firm, and broader shocks affect wide swaths of
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space around a firm. This question is particularly interesting because a theory of
systematic risk would predict that only broad shocks affecting many firms should be
priced. If this was not the case, then the shocks would be easy to diversify and in
equilibrium, investors would not demand risk premia for investing in firms exposed
to diversifiable shocks.
On the other hand, the inattention hypothesis predicts that local product market
shocks should be more important. A key reason is that broader shocks affecting
large numbers of firms should be more visible, and hence would be less susceptible
to inattention-driven anomalies. In contrast, local product market shocks are not
as visible and are more idiosyncratic, and hence the inattention hypothesis predicts
larger momentum returns.
[Insert Table VI Here]
In Table VI, we consider peers positioned in the product market in different
distance-bands around a given focal firm. For example, we consider the most local
peers defined as peers with textual cosine similarity to a given focal firm that is in
the highest 1.05% of all pairwise similarities. This threshold is equally as granular as
firms appearing in the same four digit SIC code, and firms at this level of proximity
are thus highly similar. Our second distance band includes firms that are not in the
1.05% most similar peers, but are in the 2.03% most similar peers. This threshold is
analogous to firms that are in the same three-digit SIC code, but are not in the same
four-digit SIC code. Intuitively, peers in this second group are somewhat broader in
the product market space than peers in the first band. We consider a third band that
includes firms that are as proximate in the TNIC industry space as are two-digit SIC
pairs (4.52%), but not as proximate as three-digit SIC pairs (2.03%). Finally, our
broadest band includes firms that are as proximate in the TNIC industry space as
are one-digit SIC pairs (15.8%), but not as proximate as two-digit SIC pairs (4.52%).
Intuitively, shocks to peers in this last band constitute very broad product market
shocks relative to a given focal firm, and they should be highly visible to investors.
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In Table VI, we consider shocks to these distance-based peer groups as competing
RHS variables in our standard Fama-MacBeth setting. All momentum variables are
based on peer returns using the standard 11 month horizon from t − 12 to t − 2.
As before, we consider the full sample in Panel A, and a sample that excludes the
financial crisis period in Panel B. The table shows that the product market shocks
that drive momentum are local. The inner band is highly significant in predicting
ex-post returns, as is the second band. However, both of the broader bands are not
statistically significant.
We conclude that only peers located in the product market space with similar
proximity as SIC-3 peers (analogous to the 2% most similar firm pairs among all
pairs) generate long-term momentum. This finding is not consistent with an expla-
nation for momentum based on systematic risk, as shocks that are this local should
be relatively easy to diversify. Our results thus favor the visibility and inattention
hypothesis for industry momentum.
D Idiosyncratic and Systematic Risk
We next decompose our momentum variables into a component that is due to sys-
tematic risk and a component due to idiosyncratic risk. We use the decomposition
methods discussed in Section II.D. We use projections of daily stock returns onto
the daily Fama French factors plus momentum (UMD), and we then tabulate the
total contribution of systematic risk projections to each firm’s monthly return. We
then compute peer momentum variables using our standard averaging approach. We
define the idiosyncratic component as the raw peer return minus the systematic peer
return component.
[Insert Table VII Here]
Table VII displays results for our standard asset pricing regressions, with both the
TNIC-3 idiosyncratic peer return and the systematic peer return as RHS variables.
We consider the standard horizon of t− 12 to t− 2 and also the most recent month
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return (t − 1). Panel A presents results for the full sample and Panel B for the
subsample that excludes the financial crisis.
The Table shows that, for long-term momentum, only idiosyncratic peer shocks
matter. These results reinforce our earlier findings for shorter horizons, but in a
more stark fashion. Whereas systematic peer returns do create return predictability
lasting roughly one month, they create no return predictability beyond this horizon.
We conclude that the momentum anomaly is likely due to more localized idiosyncratic
shocks affecting a smaller fraction of the firms in the economy.
E TNIC and SIC-3 Disparity
We next consider the extent to which TNIC and SIC-3 peers are the same firms.
We note that for some firms, these peers are highly concordant, and yet for others,
TNIC peers differ substantially from SIC-3 peers. Under the inattention hypothesis,
we expect long-term momentum returns to be sharpest for firms that have high
disparity across the two sets of peers. We thus compute “disparity” as one minus the
total sales of firms that are in the intersection of TNIC peers and SIC-3 peer groups
divided by the total sales of firms in the union of TNIC and SIC-3 peers. This variable
is bounded in the range [0,1], and a high value indicates that an investor relying on
SIC-3 classifications would miss a large fraction of information about product market
peers. Hence, we hypothesize that firms with high disparity are more susceptible to
momentum under the hypothesis that momentum is driven by inattention and less
visible economic links.
Our main specification in Table III focuses on momentum at the standard 11
month horizon (t − 12 to t − 2), and we rerun this model for firms in different
quintiles based on their industry disparity. In Panels A and B, we consider the full
sample and the sample that excludes the financial crisis years, respectively. Our
hypothesis is that momentum variables should be stronger in high disparity quintiles
and weaker in low disparity quintiles.
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[Insert Table VIII Here]
The results in both panels support the conclusion that momentum is stronger
for firms with more non SIC-based industry peers. The momentum variables are
positive and significant at the 1% level and highly economically significant in high
disparity quintiles. In contrast, they have much smaller magnitudes and significance
levels in the low disparity quintile.
We conclude that when firms have proximate peers that are less visible to in-
vestors, they experience greater momentum returns. This result is hard to square
with a risk based explanation, but supports slow information dissemination and a
role for the visibility of economic links. In particular, TNIC peers were less visible
to investors during our sample period, and firms with higher disparity are thus more
exposed to anomalies relating to low visibility.
F Partitioning TNIC and SIC Peers
In this section, we consider whether the past returns of various peer groups separately
predict momentum returns. We focus on three groups: (1) firms that are TNIC-3
peers but not SIC-3 peers, (2) firms that are SIC-3 peers but not text-based peers,
and (3) firms that are both TNIC-3 and SIC-3 peers. For each group of peers, we
compute the average past month t − 12 to t − 2 return for the peer group, and the
previous one-month return variable for the peer group. We then consider the same
Fama-MacBeth framework and we include all six momentum and one-month return
variables in the same model: one momentum variable and one previous month return
variable for each peer group. Our prediction is that momentum returns relating to
peers that have a less visible text-based economic link should be stronger than for
those that only have a highly visible SIC-3 link.
[Insert Table IX Here]
The results are displayed in Table IX. We find strong and consistent evidence
in rows (1) and (7) that TNIC-only peers outperform SIC-only peers in predicting
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future momentum returns. In both models, the SIC-3 only coefficient is insignificant
and close to zero, and the TNIC-3 only coefficient is positive and significant for the
t−12 to t−2 past return horizon. Interestingly, we also find that the “both TNIC and
SIC peer group” also performs well, and produces positive and significant momentum
returns. This suggests that the presence of a less visible link is more important than
the absence of a highly visible link when predicting momentum returns. This result
is consistent with the conclusion that a firm that is both a SIC and a TNIC peer
likely has an ultra-strong economic link to the firm. As investors might be inattentive
to the TNIC link, they would underreact to the especially large momentum returns
that flow through such peers following shocks. Hence, momentum returns should be
stronger for these firms than for firms that only have a SIC link. These findings are
robust both in the full sample and in the pre-2008 sample.
Table IX also displays results separately for firms by industry disparity quintiles
in rows (2) to (6) for the full sample and (7) to (12) for the pre-2008 sample. The
table shows strong and nearly monotonic sorting of the TNIC-only coefficient, which
becomes very large in the high disparity quintile. We also observe that the SIC-3 only
peers do not predict momentum returns in any of the quintiles. In contrast, the both
TNIC and SIC peer group predicts momentum returns in all of the quintiles. This
variable is slightly more significant in low to middle disparity quintiles, where the
existence of peers that are in both classifications is more common (given the definition
of disparity). In all, the findings here support our conclusion that momentum due
to less visible peers predicts strong momentum profits, whereas highly visible peers
do not.
G Calendar Time Portfolios
We next consider whether our results are robust to constructing calendar time port-
folios aimed at maximizing exposure to the various momentum variables. This ap-
proach is analogous to the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions used earlier in
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our study. In particular, the FM regression slopes imply zero-cost portfolios with
exposure only to a desired characteristic (see Fama (1976)). Yet the calendar time
approach is different in the sense that it allows us to consider controls for risk factors
using time series covariation rather than characteristics.
For a given momentum variable (TNIC-based, SIC-3-based, or own-firm-based),
we first sort firms into quintiles based on the given variable separately in each month.
In all cases, we conservatively focus on the standard horizon of t−12 to t−2, although
we note that this understates the total return that is available from these portfolios.
This understating is due to the fact that the return in the most previous month
t − 1 is the largest in terms of economic contributions (our alphas are indeed 10%
to 20% larger if we instead use t − 12 to t − 1). We then compute the returns of
equal weighted portfolios that (A) invest in the highest quintile firms and (B) invest
in the lowest quintile firms. We use the former portfolio as the long-leg of our zero
investment portfolios, and the latter portfolio as the short-leg. Therefore, we have
a consistent way of computing the returns of zero-cost portfolios for any momentum
variable. In a second stage, we then regress the returns of our zero cost portfolios on
the market factor, HML, SMB, and in some specifications, the UMD factor.5 Our
primary test is whether the intercept (which we refer to as “alpha”) is statistically
and economically distinct from zero.
[Insert Table X Here]
Table X presents the results. In Panel A, we compute the zero cost portfolios
using the aforementioned approach, but only based on the subsample of firms in the
high disparity quintile. We expect predictable returns to be particularly sharp in this
subsample, and we focus on TNIC momentum as the sort variable used to form the
long and short quintile portfolios. In rows (1) and (2), we consider the full sample
from July 1997 to December 2012, and row (1) omits the UMD factor whereas row
(2) includes the UMD factor. We note that the alpha is statistically significant with
5We thank Ken French for providing factor data on his website.
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a t-statistic ranging from 4.01 to 5.66. Economically, we observe predictable returns
in the range of 1.5% to 2.0% per month for the full sample, and 1.3% to 2.2% for
the sample that excludes the financial crisis. We also find Sharpe ratios to be in the
range of 1.2 to 1.5 depending on the specification.
In Panel B, we ignore the level of disparity and form the long and short portfolios
using the entire cross-sectional sample. We focus on TNIC momentum variables. We
continue to observe positive alphas that are mostly significant at the 1% level. In
this case, the results are roughly twice as sharp when we exclude the UMD factor
as compared to when we include it. It is unclear whether the UMD factor should
be considered in these tests given that the objective is to assess momentum return
magnitudes overall.
When we consider SIC-3 momentum in Panel C, and own-firm momentum in
Panel D, the results are weaker. SIC-3 momentum is significant at the 5% level when
UMD is not included, but becomes insignificant when UMD is included. Further-
more, the economic size of the alpha is lower, and portfolio returns are also noisier as
the Sharpe ratio for SIC-3 peers hovers near 0.50. For own firm momentum, Sharpe
ratios are lower still, and we also observe a lack of robustness to including the UMD
factor. We conclude that the calendar time tests produce results that are similar to
our baseline Fama-MacBeth regressions.
H Time Series and the Financial Crisis
In this section, we examine the time series performance of various momentum strate-
gies over our entire sample period. The objective is to examine the consistency of each
strategy in its ability to produce predictable returns, and also the extent to which
each portfolio under-performs during the financial crisis. For example, a widely held
view is that momentum investors experienced losses during the crisis period. This
question is not only interesting from an informational perspective, but also from
a theoretical perspective. For example, a finding that momentum performs poorly
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during the crisis, in itself, can be viewed as evidence supporting the systematic risk
factor hypothesis for the momentum anomaly. This result would suggest that in-
vestors were “right” to demand a risk premium for investing in these stocks.
To the contrary, evidence that momentum does not perform differentially during
the crisis might be more consistent with behavioral or market inefficiency hypotheses.
It is noteworthy that our calendar time portfolios are balanced on the long and short
legs, so even if the market performed poorly, there is no mechanistic prediction
regarding how our momentum portfolios should perform in the crisis if systematic
risk indeed does or does not explain momentum.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
We first report in Figure 1 the cumulative abnormal monthly returns for the four
momentum strategies we highlighted in Table X during our entire sample period.6 We
note that the cumulative abnormal returns in Figure 1 are adjusted after controlling
for the market factor, HML, and SMB. However, we do not control for the UMD
factor in order to focus on the full relevance of each momentum variable for this
initial test.
Figure 1 shows that own-firm momentum is the weakest strategy followed by
SIC-3 industry momentum. Also interesting is that both of these strategies did
better in the earlier part of our sample, but returns flattened some after 2000 and
2001. This flattening of returns is consistent with returns attributable to both being
highly visible and hence generating lower returns, particularly after the publication
of Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999). However, we note that returns attributable to
TNIC industry momentum continued to accumulate during the entire sample. These
continued returns are consistent with TNIC peers being less visible to the investment
community, and are consistent with the inattention hypothesis.
Perhaps most striking is the differential performance of momentum strategies
6In a given month, the cumulative abnormal return is the cumulative (alpha plus the monthly
residual) from the regressions in Table X.
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during the financial crisis period. For own-firm returns, we observe a substantial
drop in cumulative returns in late 2008 and early 2009. The ensuing recovery, even
after three years, is not strong enough to ultimately recover the losses. For SIC-3
industry momentum, we also observe a drop during the crisis, but it is not as severe.
For TNIC industry momentum, we observe an even smaller drop, and by the end
of our sample, the cumulative returns continue to reach new highs after recovering
from the relatively small drop in 2008.
Finally, when we consider the most informative momentum strategy, the strategy
based on the high disparity quintile, we observe no visible drop during the financial
crisis, and the strategy continues to produce strong gains even in the most recent
years. Because this strategy embodies the strongest momentum test under the vis-
ibility of economic links hypothesis, this result reveals that the poor performance
of own-firm momentum during the crisis was likely not due to the usual drivers of
momentum in our sample (shocks to less visible economic links), but rather was a
distinct feature relating to visible firms that had high returns in that period.
We conclude that although individual firms that had high returns prior to the
crisis did not perform well, that when the momentum anomaly is measured in the
most informative way (text-based peers with high disparity), we observe very little
in the way of poor performance in the crisis. These results are consistent with
the momentum anomaly being driven by slow dissemination of information around
shocks to less visible industry peers.
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
In Figure 2, we report analogous cumulative abnormal returns for the four mo-
mentum strategies, but this time we include a control for UMD when computing
the monthly alphas. We note that this step reduces noise in the cumulative return
patterns noted above. We draw similar conclusions: the superior performance of
TNIC portfolios is a robust result, and we continue to observe dramatic flattening
of returns attributable to SIC-3 peers and own-firm returns. Finally, we continue to
26
observe that TNIC momentum strategies were not strongly exposed to the financial
crisis.
I Attention from Professional Investors
In this section, we further examine the link between our central results and visibility
using an approach from Cohen and Frazzini (2008) (CF), who consider the extent
to which economically linked firm pairs are jointly held in mutual fund portfolios.
Such joint ownership measures the degree of institutional attention specifically to the
economic link between the pair of stocks. The authors show that mutual fund joint
ownership reduces return predictability associated with vertical customer-supplier
economic links. We consider joint ownership of horizontally linked TNIC pairs. Un-
der the inattention hypothesis, we expect our momentum variables will be strongest
in subsamples where horizontal TNIC pairs are not jointly held by mutual funds.
We use the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free US Mutual Fund database7 to compute
common ownership for each linked pair of TNIC firms as the number of mutual
funds that hold both the focal firm and the peer firm divided by the total number
of mutual funds that own the peer firm (when no funds own the peer, the overall
quantity is set to zero). We then compute the average of this quantity over each
firm’s TNIC rivals to obtain our firm-level measure of joint ownership for any given
focal firm’s TNIC industry in each month. Firms with high joint ownership are in
product markets where there is high institutional attention to economic shocks that
might affect firms in the TNIC industry. Momentum should be much weaker for such
firms.
Table XI displays the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions with the monthly
stock return as the dependent variable. As noted in the first column, we run these
regressions separately for quintile subsamples based on the above-mentioned TNIC-
7We use the data selection algorithm used in Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2007) to limit
attention to diversified equity funds as our goal is to exclude non-actively managed index funds.
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level mutual fund joint ownership, where quintiles are formed separately in each
month. The table shows that both the coefficient and the magnitude of our 10-K
Based TNIC-3 one-year momentum variable is strongly linked to the level of joint
mutual fund ownership. For the lowest quintile of joint ownership, TNIC momentum
is highly significant with a t-statistic of 4.3 and an economically large coefficient
magnitude of 0.01, indicating that firms with a one standard deviation higher level
of this variable outperform control firms by twelve percentage points per year. In the
highest quintile of joint ownership, the TNIC momentum variable is not statistically
significant and its coefficient drops to just 0.002. We also observe a strictly monotonic
pattern across the quintiles, and these results are also robust to dropping the financial
crisis period in Panel B. These results strongly support the conclusion that investor
attention to linked firms, especially attention from institutional investors, plays a
role in determining when momentum returns are large and when they are not.
J Robustness
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) consider a random industry portfolio test to rein-
force their conclusion that actual economic links between firms in the same industry
explain their results. In Online Appendix Table A3, we repeat this test for our
TNIC-based one year momentum variables. As in our earlier tests, our momentum
variables are lagged one month to further ensure that our results are not susceptible
to the Grundy and Martin (2001) critique. In particular, we form for each firm a ran-
dom industry portfolio containing firms that had nearly the same past return as its
actual set of industry peers. Each random portfolio also contains the same number of
random peers as the firm’s actual TNIC industry. Under the prediction that actual
economic links between firms drives our results, and not simply past return patterns,
we predict that actual industry peers will much more strongly predict momentum
returns than will the random industry portfolios. We find that this is indeed the
case, and the momentum results for actual industry peers are economically much
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larger, and are significantly stronger than the random peers at the 1% level.
Hou (2007) documents that the well-known result that large firm stock returns
lead those of smaller firms is primarily due to within-industry return predictability.
We examine if our results can be explained by Hou (2007) using a series of tests in
Table A4 of the Online Appendix. First, we note that ex-ante, we should not expect
our results to be related to those in Hou (2007) because we are addressing the long-
term momentum anomaly (which can predict returns over 12 months), whereas the
lead-lag anomaly is short-term in nature (one month or less). Nevertheless, Table A4
shows that our results (A) are robust to lagged return variables constructed using
the more specific methods of Hou (2007), (B) are further robust when the lagged
return controls are only based on larger firms, and (C) our results are also robust
if we restrict the regression sample to only include firms in the largest tercile of
firms based on firm size. We conclude that our results are indeed distinct from the
short-term lead-lag anomaly results in Hou (2007).
We additionally examine in Table A5 of the Online Appendix if our results are
stronger when past returns are negative or when they are positive. This test is related
to Hou (2007), who finds stronger results when past returns are negative, consistent
with the lead-lag anomaly being related to short sale constraints. We find that our
results are significant for both positive and negative past returns, but are stronger
when past returns are positive. This further suggests that our results are distinct
from the lead-lag anomaly. In particular, our study broadly supports the conclusion
that industry momentum is due to investor inattention, which indeed is distinct from
short sale constraints.
V Long-Term Reversals
Many existing studies propose that the momentum anomaly (Jegadeesh and Titman
(1993)) and the long-term reversal anomaly (Debondt and Thaler (1985)) are related.
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In Section I, we hypothesized that both might be explained by inattention to less
visible economic links after they are shocked. This hypothesis is based on the theo-
retical models offered by Hong and Stein (1999) and Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1998) for example. Going beyond these models at least in part, we more specifically
hypothesize that low attention to economically related firms might drive momen-
tum. In this section, we test this hypothesis by examining if long-term momentum
reversals only exist in subsamples where less visible and highly visible industry peers
experience differential returns. This test relies on the assumption once again that
the visibility of the economic links is the central issue generating momentum. From
an inattention perspective, the assumption is that investors will be inattentive when
a large return-differential develops between the long-term returns of less visible peers
and those of the more efficiently priced highly visible peers.
We examine this hypothesis in Table XII, where we report Fama-MacBeth re-
gressions with the monthly stock return as the dependent variable. Panels A and
B consider momentum and reversal returns for our entire cross sectional sample in
the full time series sample and the pre-2008 sample. In Panels C and D, we then
consider cross sectional quintiles of the data using the long-term return-differential
between less visible TNIC industry peers and highly visible SIC industry peers. In
particular, we compute the TNIC industry return during the past three year horizon
(months t − 2 to t − 36), and divide by the SIC-3 industry return during the same
period. A high value indicates that less visible peer returns outpaced more visible
peer returns during the past three year window, indicating likely overreaction due
to inattention to this return differential. We sort firms into quintiles based on this
ratio separately for each month.
In these respective samples, we focus on momentum and long-term reversal return
predictions. Our primary variable of interest is the TNIC past return from month
t− 36 to t− 13, which relates to the timing of predicted reversals given the existing
literature. We also consider the past 11 month TNIC return to control for positive
30
momentum, and we also separately consider the most recent month’s return. All RHS
variables are standardized prior to running the regression for ease of comparison and
standard errors are adjusted using Newey-West with two lags.
Panels A and B of Table XII document that the long-term reversal effect is
statistically significant in our pre-2008 sample, although it falls below traditional
significance levels in the full sample. More importantly, we focus on the predictions
regarding Panels B and C that the reversal effect should only be present when less
visible peer stock returns have outpaced highly visible peer stock returns. We find
in both the full sample, and also in the pre-2008 sample, strong support for this
prediction. In the full sample in Panel B, we find a highly significant reversal at the
1% level for the highest return-differential quintile, and a coefficient close to zero for
the low return differential quintile. We find similar results in Panel D for the pre
2008 sample.
We conclude that the long-term reversal only exists in the subsample where less
visible peer returns have outpaced highly visible peer returns. These results are
consistent with overshooting following initially positive momentum returns creating
long-term reversals as in Hong and Stein (1999) and Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1998). Going beyond the direct predictions of these studies, we provide evidence
that inattention specifically to shocks to less visible economic links can explain both
the momentum anomaly and also the subsequent long-term reversal anomaly. Our
results also draw new attention to industry momentum, which has been largely dis-
missed by scholars following the critique by Grundy and Martin (2001). Our results
further suggest that earlier studies found only weak evidence of industry momentum
primarily because they were focused on highly visible industry links in their tests.
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VI Conclusions
We find that momentum is strongly linked to shocks to less visible industry peers.
We examine industry peers based on traditional SIC based groupings and new text-
based industry peers. Both peer groups capture horizontal industry relatedness.
The peer groups differ in that SIC-based peers were highly visible to investors in our
sample, and text-based peers were less visible. Investors had access to SIC-based
peers through widely used financial databases, disclosures to the SEC, and market
reports. However, text-based network industry peers were not widely distributed
during our sample. We find that shocks to less visible text-based peers produce long-
lived momentum profits that are economically large in magnitude. In contrast, more
visible traditional SIC-based industry peers produce only short lived momentum
profits that are small in magnitude. These results are robust to controlling for own
firm momentum and vertical industry links examined in previous studies.
These findings support the hypothesis that momentum is driven by inattention to
less visible economic links supporting theories of inattention including Hong and Stein
(1999) and Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). Our finding that industry-based
economic links are important to understanding momentum runs counter to prevailing
views in the literature as Grundy and Martin (2001) show that industry momentum
based on traditional SIC codes is not robust to the bid-ask bounce. Jegadeesh and
Titman (2011) underscore this finding in their recent review, concluding that industry
momentum is not highly relevant.
Our findings suggest that the earlier reports of weak industry momentum profits
are likely explained by the fact that industry momentum was tested using the more
visible SIC-based industry links. Our inattention hypothesis predicts that this is not
an ideal setting for testing industry momentum. Reexamining industry momentum
using less-visible text-based industry peers, we find that industry momentum is far
more robust, and momentum profits overall become 2-3 times large in economic
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magnitude relative to other momentum variables.
Additional tests further support the role of low visibility. When firms have highly
visible peer networks that disagree with less visible peer networks, momentum profits
are stronger. Results are also stronger when mutual funds do not jointly own the
economically linked firms in a given TNIC industry, illustrating that inattention
from professional investors is a specific channel. This suggests that highly visible
SIC-based industry peers serve as a channel to quickly transmit information that
otherwise transmits slowly through the less visible text-based peer network. We also
find that momentum arises from localized shocks in the industry space, which are
likely subjected to less attention than are systematic shocks.
Low visibility and inattention can also explain why momentum profits reverse
over longer horizons. We find that reversals only occur in subsamples where a re-
turn differential develops between the returns of less visible text-based peers and
visible SIC-based peers. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that longer
term inattention to this return differential can explain when momentum returns will
overreact and reverse. Our paper thus provides strong evidence that industry mo-
mentum is important in explaining momentum overall, and that inattention to less
visible economic links plays a strong role.
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Table I: Summary Statistics
Summary statistics are reported for our sample of 811,672 observations based on monthly return data from July
1997 to December 2012. Observations are required to be in CRSP, COMPUSTAT, and our 10-K database.
Consistent with existing studies, observations must have a one year history of past stock return data to compute
momentum variables, and must have a stock price in the preceding month that is greater than one dollar. One
observation is one firm in one month. The 11 month momentum variable measures past returns from month t-2 to
t-11, again consistent with the literature. The industry momentum variables (SIC-3 in Panel B) and (TNIC-3 in
Panel C) are based on averages for the given industry classifications, but all industry returns exclude the firm itself
as this form of momentum is reflected in the own-momentum variable. Panel D displays Pearson correlation
coefficients.
Std.
Variable Mean Dev. Minimum Median Maximum
Panel A: Data from the Existing Literature
Monthly Return 0.009 0.172 -0.981 0.002 9.374
Log B/M Ratio -7.573 0.935 -16.164 -7.494 -1.223
Log Market Cap 12.661 2.008 6.233 12.570 20.121
Month t-1 Past Return 0.012 0.172 -0.878 0.003 13.495
Month t-2 to t-4 Past Return 0.044 0.345 -0.947 0.017 41.400
Month t-2 to t-7 Past Return 0.085 0.539 -0.967 0.030 66.914
Month t-2 to t-12 Past Return 0.157 0.809 -0.989 0.050 98.571
Panel B: Data from SIC-3 industries
Month t-1 Past Return 0.011 0.088 -0.769 0.011 6.267
Month t-2 to t-4 Past Return 0.035 0.175 -0.926 0.030 12.333
Month t-2 to t-7 Past Return 0.070 0.273 -0.966 0.051 37.533
Month t-2 to t-12 Past Return 0.134 0.400 -0.988 0.087 36.130
Panel C: Data from 10-K based TNIC-3
Month t-1 Past Return 0.012 0.101 -0.920 0.012 9.374
Month t-2 to t-4 Past Return 0.038 0.200 -0.975 0.032 11.566
Month t-2 to t-7 Past Return 0.075 0.312 -0.995 0.052 24.132
Month t-2 to t-12 Past Return 0.143 0.466 -0.996 0.085 28.239
11 Month 11 Month
Log Book Log Mkt Own- SIC-3
Monthly to Market Capital- Firm Industry
Row Variable Return Ratio ization Return Return
Panel D: Pearson Correlations
(1) B/M Ratio 0.024
(2) Log Mkt Cap -0.012 -0.307
(3) Month t-2 to t-12 Own-Firm Return 0.006 0.034 -0.004
(4) Month t-2 to t-12 SIC-3 Return -0.002 0.043 -0.021 0.382
(5) Month t-2 to t-12 TNIC-3 Return 0.009 0.029 -0.021 0.448 0.694
36
Table II: Return Comovement
Fama-MacBeth regressions with own-firm monthly stock return as the dependent variable. One observation is one
firm from July 1997 to December 2012. The independent variable includes the SIC-based return benchmark
(excluding the firm itself) and the text-based return benchmark (also excluding the firm itself). We also include
controls for the Fama and French (1992) variables (log book to market ratio and log size), a dummy for negative
book to market ratio stocks (the dummy is not displayed to conserve space and is not significant), and a control for
momentum (defined as the own-firm 11 month lagged return from month t− 12 to t− 2). Panel A displays results
for simultaneously measured returns and industry returns (non-predictive), and Panel B displays results for various
lags to the industry peer return variables as noted in the dependent variable column (predictive regressions for
(t + 1) for (t + 3)). All peer variables are standardized to have a standard deviation of one for ease of comparison
and interpretation. All standard errors are adjusted using Newey-West with two lags.
Text-based SIC-3 Log Past
Dependent Peer Peer B/M Log 11 Mon. RSQ /
Row Variable Return Return Ratio Size Return # Obs.
Panel A: All Firms
(1) Month t Returns 0.030 0.024 0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.071
(33.95) (36.85) (3.33) (-0.41) (0.12) 811,672
(2) Month t Returns 0.039 0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.061
(34.97) (2.85) (-0.39) (0.19) 811,672
(3) Month t Returns 0.037 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.055
(36.49) (2.48) (-0.44) (0.34) 811,672
Panel B: All Firms, various lags
(4) Month t Returns 0.030 0.024 0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.071
(33.95) (36.85) (3.33) (-0.41) (0.12) 811,672
(5) Month t + 1 Returns 0.007 0.004 0.002 -0.001 -0.000 0.036
(5.94) (4.54) (1.91) (-0.46) (-0.11) 802,811
(6) Month t + 2 Returns 0.004 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.035
(2.90) (1.84) (1.85) (-0.53) (-0.57) 793,926
(7) Month t + 3 Returns 0.003 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.033
(2.41) (0.88) (1.44) (-0.63) (-0.45) 784,990
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Table III: Fama MacBeth Return Regressions (Various Momentum Variables)
Fama-MacBeth regressions with the monthly stock return as the dependent variable. The independent variables are all measured ex-ante using the lag structure given by Fama and
French. The key variables include own-firm momentum, SIC-3 based momentum, and 10-K Based TNIC-3 momentum. We consider the past 11 month returns (skipping the most
recent) as the benchmark consistent with other studies, and we separately consider the most recent month (known as the reversal variable). Industry momentum variables are based on
the average past returns of rival firms in each industry where the firm itself is excluded from the average. The SIC-3 average is equal weighted, and the TNIC-3 average is similarity
weighted. We also include controls for size and book to market. In the sample column, we note that we consider the entire sample, and the sample that ends prior to the 2008-2009
crisis period. All RHS variables are standardized prior to running the regression for ease of comparison. All standard errors are adjusted using Newey-West with two lags.
t-2 to t-12 t-2 to t-12 t-1 t-1
t-2 to t-12 TNIC-3 SIC-3 t-1 TNIC-3 SIC-3 Log Market Log Book
Own Firm Industry Industry Own Firm Industry Industry Capital- to Market # Months/
Row Sample Past Return Past Return Past Return Past Return Past Return Past Return ization Ratio R2 # Obs.
Panel A: All Months 7/97 to 12/12
(1) All Months 0.002 -0.004 -0.001 0.002 0.035 186
(0.54) (-3.26) (-0.36) (1.61) 811,672
(2) All Months 0.006 0.008 -0.000 0.002 0.035 186
(2.33) (6.60) (-0.30) (2.09) 811,672
(3) All Months 0.002 0.007 -0.000 0.002 0.031 186
(1.20) (5.67) (-0.25) (1.81) 811,672
(4) All Months 0.001 0.002 -0.005 0.008 -0.000 0.002 0.044 186
(0.38) (1.48) (-4.67) (7.01) (-0.35) (1.99) 811,672
(5) All Months -0.000 0.006 -0.000 -0.006 0.008 0.005 -0.000 0.002 0.050 186
(-0.07) (4.36) (-0.30) (-5.92) (8.82) (5.96) (-0.37) (2.32) 811,672
Panel B: Pre-Crisis Months 7/97 to 12/07
(6) Pre-2008 0.004 -0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.037 126
(2.20) (-2.38) (-0.75) (1.45) 596,065
(7) Pre-2008 0.008 0.009 -0.001 0.003 0.042 126
(3.30) (6.31) (-0.73) (1.96) 596,065
(8) Pre-2008 0.004 0.008 -0.001 0.003 0.035 126
(2.01) (5.54) (-0.66) (1.70) 596,065
(9) Pre-2008 0.004 0.003 -0.004 0.009 -0.001 0.003 0.047 126
(2.16) (1.98) (-3.54) (6.52) (-0.75) (1.88) 596,065
(10) Pre-2008 0.002 0.007 0.000 -0.006 0.009 0.005 -0.001 0.003 0.054 126
(1.44) (4.27) (0.04) (-4.71) (8.14) (5.53) (-0.77) (2.22) 596,065
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Table IV: Fama MacBeth Return Regressions (Control for Vertical Links)
Fama-MacBeth regressions with the monthly stock return as the dependent variable. The models are analogous to those in Table III, except that we add controls for shocks to
vertically linked firms following Cohen and Frazzini (2008) (vertical links using customer links) and Menzley and Ozbas (2010) (vertical links using the input-output tables). We follow
the procedures used in both studies to compute the respective vertical-peer shocks. For customer links, we use the Compustat segment files, and we lag information on major
customers 6 months to avoid look-ahead bias. For a given firm, we compute the average return of its major customers using both the standard 11 month window we use for TNIC
momentum (t− 2 to t− 12) and separately for the most recent month return (t− 1). We then include both variables as additional RHS variables in our Fama-MacBeth regressions. For
IO-table vertical peer returns, we use the 1997 and 2002 Input-Output tables given that we predict returns from July 1997 and forward. In all cases, we use ex-ante measurable
economic links from these files. We then compute the average returns separately for both upstream industries and downstream industries using both the standard 11 month window we
use for TNIC momentum (t− 2 to t− 12) and separately for the most recent month return (t− 1). We then compute the average of the individual upstream and downstream industry
returns and use these averaged returns as our additional RHS variables for both return windows. In the sample column, we note that we consider the entire sample, and the sample
that ends prior to the 2008-2009 crisis period. All RHS variables are standardized prior to running the regression for ease of comparison. All standard errors are adjusted using
Newey-West with two lags.
t-2 to t-12 t-2 to t-12 t-2 to t-12 t-1 t-1 t-1
TNIC-3 t-2 to t-12 Customer IO Table TNIC-3 t-1 Customer IO Table
Industry Own Firm Vertical Vertical Industry Own Firm Vertical Vertical FF # Months/
Row Sample Past Return Past Return Past Return Past Return Past Return Past Return Past Return Past Return Controls # Obs.
Panel A: All Months 7/97 to 12/12
(1) All Months 0.005 0.008 Yes 186
(2.28) (6.57) 783,635
(2) All Months 0.001 -0.004 Yes 186
(0.49) (-3.47) 783,635
(3) All Months 0.001 0.001 Yes 186
(1.84) (1.91) 783,635
(4) All Months 0.002 0.007 Yes 186
(0.55) (2.13) 783,635
(5) All Months 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.005 0.001 0.008 Yes 186
(0.39) (2.22) (0.48) (-4.03) (2.26) (2.52) 783,635
(6) All Months 0.006 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.009 -0.006 0.000 0.004 Yes 186
(3.80) (-0.16) (1.96) (-0.60) (9.01) (-5.59) (1.45) (1.69) 783,635
Panel B: Pre-Crisis Months 7/97 to 12/07
(7) Pre-2008 0.008 0.010 Yes 126
(3.13) (6.29) 576,046
(8) Pre-2008 0.004 -0.004 Yes 126
(2.12) (-2.56) 576,046
(9) Pre-2008 0.002 0.001 Yes 126
(2.22) (1.42) 576,046
(10) Pre-2008 0.003 0.010 Yes 126
(0.91) (2.30) 576,046
(11) Pre-2008 0.004 0.002 0.003 -0.004 0.001 0.011 Yes 126
(2.08) (2.46) (0.78) (-3.02) (1.64) (2.71) 576,046
(12) Pre-2008 0.007 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.010 -0.006 0.000 0.006 Yes 126
(3.70) (1.29) (2.31) (-0.46) (8.21) (-4.47) (1.01) (2.20) 576,046
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Table V: Fama MacBeth Return Regressions (Various Momentum Horizons)
Fama-MacBeth regressions with the monthly stock return as the dependent variable. The independent variables are all measured ex-ante using the lag structure given by Fama and
French. The key variables include own-firm momentum, SIC-3 based momentum, and 10-K Based TNIC-3 momentum. We consider momentum horizons that range from 3 months to
24 months long. Industry momentum variables are based on the average past returns of rival firms in each industry where the firm itself is excluded from the average. The SIC-3
average is equal weighted, and the TNIC-3 average is similarity weighted. We also include controls for size and book to market. In the sample column, we note that we consider the
entire sample, and the sample that that ends prior to the 2008-2009 crisis period. All RHS variables are standardized prior to running the regression for ease of comparison. All
standard errors are adjusted using Newey-West with two lags.
TNIC-3 SIC-3 Log Market Log Book
Sample & Own Firm Industry Industry Capital- to Market # Months/
Row Duration Past Return Past Return Past Return ization Ratio R2 # Obs.
Panel A: All Months 7/97 to 12/12
(1) All Months: 3 month momentum -0.001 0.007 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.034 186
(-0.63) (4.56) (2.40) (-0.45) (1.76) 811,672
(2) All Months: 6 month momentum -0.000 0.007 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.036 186
(-0.17) (4.49) (0.86) (-0.53) (1.70) 811,672
(3) All Months: 11 month momentum 0.000 0.007 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.037 186
(0.06) (3.88) (0.17) (-0.48) (1.92) 811,672
(4) All Months: 24 month momentum -0.003 0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.031 186
(-1.06) (1.12) (0.33) (-0.43) (1.09) 766,444
Panel B: Pre-Crisis Months 7/97 to 12/07
(5) Pre-2008: 3 month momentum -0.000 0.007 0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.039 126
(-0.20) (3.67) (2.21) (-0.83) (1.68) 596,065
(6) Pre-2008: 6 month momentum 0.002 0.009 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.041 126
(1.75) (4.24) (1.64) (-0.92) (1.60) 596,065
(7) Pre-2008: 11 month momentum 0.002 0.008 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.042 126
(1.59) (3.87) (0.48) (-0.85) (1.88) 596,065
(8) Pre-2008: 24 month momentum 0.001 0.004 0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.035 126
(0.58) (2.70) (0.88) (-0.94) (1.22) 558,887
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Table VI: Fama MacBeth Return Regressions (Industry Breadth)
Fama-MacBeth regressions with the monthly stock return as the dependent variable. The independent variables are all measured ex-ante using the lag structure given by Fama and
French. The key variables include own-firm momentum, SIC-3 based momentum, and 10-K Based TNIC momentum. We compute TNIC momentum using various granularities as
noted in the first column: TNIC-4 (analogous to SIC-4), TNIC-3 (analogous to SIC-3), TNIC-2 (analogous to SIC-2), and TNIC-1 (analogous to SIC-1). We consider the past 11
month returns (skipping the most recent) as the benchmark consistent with other studies, and we separately consider the most recent month (known as the reversal variable). Industry
momentum variables are based on the average past returns of rival firms in each industry where the firm itself is excluded from the average. The SIC-3 average is equal weighted, and
the TNIC averages are similarity weighted. We also include controls for size and book to market. We also note that we consider the entire sample, and the sample that ends prior to
the 2008-2009 crisis period as noted in the first column. All RHS variables are standardized prior to running the regression for ease of comparison. All standard errors are adjusted
using Newey-West with two lags.
t-2 to t-12 t-2 to t-12 t-2 to t-12 t-2 to t-12 t-2 to t-12 t-2 to t-12 t-1
TNIC-4 TNIC-(3-4) TNIC-(2-3) TNIC-(1-2) Own Firm SIC-3 Own Firm Log Mkt Log Book
Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry Capital- to Market # Months/
Row Sample Past Ret. Past Ret. Past Ret. Past Ret. Past Ret. Past Ret. Past Ret. ization Ratio R2 # Obs.
(1) All Months 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.000 -0.004 -0.000 0.002 0.045 186
(3.69) (3.84) (0.54) (0.09) (-4.08) (-0.25) (2.25) 811,672
(2) All Months 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.004 -0.000 0.002 0.050 186
(4.55) (4.17) (0.60) (0.28) (-0.04) (-0.20) (-4.26) (-0.36) (2.33) 811,672
(3) All Months 0.003 0.005 -0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.001 0.002 0.045 186
(4.71) (3.10) (-0.02) (0.14) (-3.99) (-0.41) (1.99) 811,672
Panel B: Pre-Crisis Months 7/97 to 12/07
(4) Pre-2008 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.001 0.003 0.050 126
(4.29) (4.32) (0.88) (0.19) (-3.32) (-0.65) (2.23) 596,065
(5) Pre-2008 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.004 -0.001 0.003 0.054 126
(4.96) (4.17) (0.65) (0.14) (1.59) (0.65) (-3.35) (-0.76) (2.30) 596,065
(6) Pre-2008 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.002 0.003 0.049 126
(4.84) (3.04) (1.56) (0.54) (-3.12) (-0.79) (1.93) 596,065
41
Table VII: Fama MacBeth Return Regressions (Idiosyncratic and Systematic Risk)
Fama-MacBeth regressions with the monthly stock return as the dependent variable. The independent variables include momentum variables based on the systematic and idiosyncratic
portions of the text-based return benchmark. To compute the systematic portion, we first regress (for each month) daily stock returns for each firm onto the three Fama French factors
and the momentum factor. The projection from this regression (excluding the projection from the intercept) is the systematic portion of a firm’s daily return. These are then aggregated
to monthly observations, and we compute the average of these systematic returns over each firm’s text based peers to get the “Systematic Peer Return”. The idiosyncratic Peer Return
is the raw text-based peer return minus the systematic peer return. TNIC-3 momentum variables are based on the average past returns of rival firms in each TNIC industry where the
firm itself is excluded from the average. We also include controls for size and book to market. We consider the entire sample (Panel A) and the sample that ends prior to the 2008-2009
crisis period (Panel B). All RHS variables are standardized prior to running the regression for ease of comparison. All standard errors are adjusted using Newey-West with two lags.
Idiosyn. Systematic Idiosyn. Systematic
t-2 to t-12 t-2 to t-12 t-1 t-1
TNIC-3 TNIC-3 TNIC-3 TNIC-3 Log Market Log Book
Industry Industry Industry Industry Capital- to Market # Months/
Row Sample Past Return Past Return Past Return Past Return ization Ratio R2 # Obs.
Panel A: All Months 7/97 to 12/12
(1) All Months 0.005 0.001 0.006 0.007 -0.000 0.002 0.041 186
(2.97) (0.80) (7.40) (4.07) (-0.35) (2.22) 811,672
(2) All Months 0.005 0.005 -0.000 0.003 0.027 186
(3.85) (6.49) (-0.11) (2.12) 811,672
(3) All Months -0.000 0.004 -0.000 0.002 0.030 186
(-0.23) (2.15) (-0.30) (1.54) 811,672
Panel B: Pre-Crisis Months 7/97 to 12/07
(4) Pre-2008 0.008 0.002 0.008 0.009 -0.001 0.003 0.047 126
(4.15) (1.29) (7.02) (4.32) (-0.72) (2.18) 596,065
(5) Pre-2008 0.007 0.006 -0.001 0.003 0.031 126
(3.90) (5.55) (-0.51) (1.97) 596,065
(6) Pre-2008 -0.000 0.005 -0.001 0.002 0.035 126
(-0.07) (2.10) (-0.67) (1.43) 596,065
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Table VIII: Fama MacBeth Return Regressions (High and Low Industry Disparity)
Fama-MacBeth regressions with the monthly stock return as the dependent variable. A key variable we use to subsample the data is industry disparity, which is one minus the total
sales of firms in the intersection of TNIC-3 and SIC-3 peers divided by the total sales of firms in the union of TNIC-3 and SIC-3 peers. This quantity measures how similar TNIC-3
and SIC-3 are for the given firm. As noted in the first column, we run the stock return regressions for subsamples based on quintiles of disparity, where quintiles are formed separately
in each month. The independent variables are all measured ex-ante using the lag structure given by Fama and French. The key variables include 10-K Based TNIC-3 momentum. We
consider the past 11 month returns (skipping the most recent) as the benchmark consistent with other studies, and we separately consider the most recent month. TNIC-3 momentum
variables are based on the average past returns of rival firms in each TNIC industry where the firm itself is excluded from the average. We also include controls for size and book to
market. We consider the entire sample (Panel A) and the sample that ends prior to the 2008-2009 crisis period (Panel B). All RHS variables are standardized prior to running the
regression for ease of comparison. All standard errors are adjusted using Newey-West with two lags.
t-2 to t-12 t-1
TNIC-3 TNIC-3 Log Market Log Book
Industry Industry Capital- to Market # Months/
Row Sample Past Return Past Return ization Ratio R2 # Obs.
Panel A: All Months 7/97 to 12/12
(1) Low Disparity 0.002 0.007 0.000 0.002 0.036 186
(1.06) (5.50) (0.25) (2.09) 162,918
(2) Quintile 2 0.004 0.014 -0.001 0.000 0.065 186
(0.91) (6.14) (-0.67) (0.33) 162,897
(3) Quintile 3 0.005 0.011 -0.001 0.002 0.052 186
(1.62) (5.90) (-0.91) (1.79) 162,863
(4) Quintile 4 0.006 0.009 -0.001 0.002 0.037 186
(2.22) (6.97) (-0.72) (1.54) 162,379
(5) High Disparity 0.009 0.005 -0.001 0.004 0.026 186
(4.82) (5.09) (-0.41) (4.06) 160,615
Panel B: Pre-Crisis Months 7/97 to 12/07
(6) Low Disparity 0.003 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.038 126
(2.02) (6.92) (0.28) (2.20) 119,806
(7) Quintile 2 0.008 0.015 -0.003 0.001 0.069 126
(1.94) (5.47) (-1.30) (0.65) 119,628
(8) Quintile 3 0.008 0.013 -0.002 0.003 0.062 126
(2.62) (5.35) (-0.98) (1.67) 119,645
(9) Quintile 4 0.009 0.010 -0.002 0.003 0.039 126
(3.78) (6.15) (-0.87) (2.09) 119,211
(10) High Disparity 0.010 0.006 -0.002 0.004 0.027 126
(4.67) (5.21) (-1.06) (3.03) 117,775
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Table IX: Fama MacBeth Return Regressions (Various Peer Groups)
Fama-MacBeth regressions with the monthly stock return as the dependent variable. A key variable we use to subsample the data is industry disparity, which is one minus the total
sales of firms in the intersection of TNIC-3 and SIC-3 peers divided by the total sales of firms in the union of TNIC-3 and SIC-3 peers. As noted in the first column, we run the stock
return regressions for the full sample and for subsamples based on quintiles of disparity, where quintiles are formed separately in each month. The independent variables are all
measured ex-ante using the lag structure given by Fama and French. The key variables include momentum and one-month reversal variables based on three peer groups: TNIC peers
that are not SIC peers, SIC peers that are not TNIC peers, and peers that are both TNIC and SIC peers. We consider the past 11 month returns (skipping the most recent) as the
benchmark consistent with other studies, and we separately consider the most recent month. Momentum variables for each peer group are based on the average past returns of rival
firms in each TNIC industry where the firm itself is excluded from the average. We also include controls for size and book to market, although we do not display them to conserve
space. We consider the entire sample (Panel A) and the sample that ends prior to the 2008-2009 crisis period (Panel B). All RHS variables are standardized prior to running the
regression for ease of comparison. All standard errors are adjusted using Newey-West with two lags.
t-2 to t-12 t-2 to t-12 t-2 to t-12 t-1 t-1 t-1
TNIC-3 SIC-3 Both TNIC TNIC-3 SIC-3 Both TNIC Log Market Log Book
Only Peers Only Peers & SIC Only Peers Only Peers & SIC Capital- to Market # Months/
Row Sample Past Return Past Return Past Return Past Return Past Return Past Return ization Ratio R2 # Obs.
Panel A: All Months 7/97 to 12/12
(1) All Months 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.002 0.037 186
(1.93) (0.27) (2.40) (2.87) (1.33) (2.29) (-0.36) (2.02) 811,672
(2) Low Disparity -0.002 -0.000 0.004 0.003 -0.000 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.055 186
(-1.31) (-0.36) (1.39) (2.83) (-0.02) (1.56) (0.31) (1.48) 163,597
(3) Quintile 2 0.000 -0.003 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.067 186
(0.03) (-1.89) (1.59) (1.34) (1.35) (0.51) (-1.03) (0.57) 159,466
(4) Quintile 3 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.054 186
(0.48) (0.75) (2.14) (1.84) (0.35) (1.34) (-0.63) (1.54) 158,452
(5) Quintile 4 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.040 186
(1.28) (0.67) (4.46) (2.59) (0.84) (1.90) (-0.51) (1.86) 153,391
(6) High Disparity 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.004 0.031 186
(3.90) (1.68) (2.12) (3.03) (1.03) (0.94) (-0.64) (4.19) 133,505
Panel B: Pre-Crisis Months 7/97 to 12/07
(7) All Months 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.043 126
(2.12) (0.74) (3.50) (2.44) (1.20) (1.73) (-0.80) (1.89) 596,065
(8) Low Disparity -0.000 -0.000 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.004 -0.000 0.002 0.060 126
(-0.21) (-0.23) (2.27) (2.33) (0.84) (1.53) (-0.04) (1.77) 123,560
(9) Quintile 2 -0.001 -0.001 0.008 0.004 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.070 126
(-0.30) (-0.97) (2.95) (1.76) (0.69) (0.09) (-1.36) (0.78) 117,005
(10) Quintile 3 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.004 -0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.061 126
(1.65) (1.45) (2.48) (2.01) (-0.37) (1.17) (-0.88) (1.49) 116,355
(11) Quintile 4 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.042 126
(2.35) (0.48) (4.92) (1.88) (1.07) (1.68) (-0.54) (2.32) 112,477
(12) High Disparity 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.004 0.032 126
(3.39) (1.28) (2.65) (2.45) (1.09) (0.79) (-1.47) (3.32) 96,946
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Table X: Calendar Time Portfolios (BJS Alpha Tests)
We report OLS coefficients and factor loadings based on calendar time zero investment portfolios investing long in
positive momentum stocks and short in negative momentum stocks. The portfolios are constructed from varying
definitions of momentum: TNIC-3 momentum (Panels A and B), SIC-3 momentum (Panel C), and own momentum
(Panel D). All tests are based on the full sample except Panel A, which is based on portfolios of stocks in the
highest quintile of industry disparity (one minus the total sales of all firms in the intersection of TNIC-3 and SIC-3
peer groups, divided by the total sales of firms in the union of the given firm’s TNIC-3 and SIC-3 industries). We
consider a one year measurement period for past returns excluding the most recent month as noted. Zero
investment calendar time portfolios are constructed by first sorting firms into quintiles based on the given
momentum variables in each month. We then compute equal weighted average returns of firms in the highest
quintile, and subtract the equal weighted returns of firms in the lowest quintile. Annualized Sharpe ratios are
computed as the square root of twelve times the monthly mean divided by the monthly standard deviation. We
report the Sharpe ratio of the raw return (top) and the residual return (bottom) for each specification.
Sample / Sharpe
Row Horizon Alpha MKT HML SMB UMD Ratios R2 Obs.
Panel A: 10-K Based TNIC-3 Momentum (High Disparity Quintile), long/short quintiles
(1) All Months 0.020 -0.291 -0.267 0.540 1.160 0.182 186
t-2 to t-12 Momentum (4.98) (-3.47) (-2.25) (4.72) 1.292
(2) All Months 0.015 0.030 -0.044 0.393 0.704 1.160 0.620 186
t-2 to t-12 Momentum (5.66) (0.49) (-0.53) (4.98) (14.46) 1.480
(3) Pre-2008 0.022 -0.366 -0.233 0.651 1.132 0.220 126
t-2 to t-12 Momentum (4.10) (-2.61) (-1.26) (4.47) 1.320
(4) Pre-2008 0.013 0.028 -0.038 0.398 0.918 1.132 0.746 126
t-2 to t-12 Momentum (4.01) (0.34) (-0.36) (4.68) (15.82) 1.320
Panel B: 10-K Based TNIC-3 Momentum, long/short quintiles
(5) All Months 0.015 -0.387 -0.290 0.565 0.661 0.134 186
t-2 to t-12 Momentum (2.83) (-3.47) (-1.83) (3.71) 0.734
(6) All Months 0.008 0.118 0.061 0.335 1.107 0.661 0.781 186
t-2 to t-12 Momentum (3.03) (1.96) (0.75) (4.32) (23.15) 0.792
(7) Pre-2008 0.021 -0.607 -0.382 0.624 0.782 0.177 126
t-2 to t-12 Momentum (2.99) (-3.31) (-1.58) (3.27) 0.962
(8) Pre-2008 0.008 -0.039 -0.102 0.258 1.325 0.782 0.849 126
t-2 to t-12 Momentum (2.41) (-0.47) (-0.98) (3.09) (23.24) 0.793
Panel C: SIC-Momentum, long/short quintiles
(9) All Months 0.009 -0.271 -0.270 0.412 0.459 0.109 186
t-1 to t-12 Momentum (1.98) (-2.83) (-2.00) (3.15) 0.514
(10) All Months 0.003 0.147 0.020 0.221 0.916 0.459 0.729 186
t-1 to t-12 Momentum (1.32) (2.60) (0.26) (3.03) (20.38) 0.345
(11) Pre-2008 0.014 -0.501 -0.367 0.457 0.570 0.158 126
t-1 to t-12 Momentum (2.29) (-3.20) (-1.79) (2.81) 0.737
(12) Pre-2008 0.002 -0.030 -0.135 0.154 1.097 0.570 0.808 126
t-1 to t-12 Momentum (0.84) (-0.39) (-1.36) (1.94) (20.26) 0.275
Panel D: Own-Momentum, long/short quintiles
(13) All Months 0.010 -0.482 -0.266 0.075 0.340 0.094 186
t-2 to t-12 Momentum (1.80) (-4.22) (-1.64) (0.48) 0.466
(14) All Months 0.002 0.074 0.120 -0.180 1.219 0.340 0.876 186
t-2 to t-12 Momentum (1.09) (1.63) (1.96) (-3.07) (33.75) 0.284
(15) Pre-2008 0.015 -0.507 -0.179 0.140 0.564 0.070 126
t-2 to t-12 Momentum (2.15) (-2.87) (-0.77) (0.76) 0.691
(16) Pre-2008 0.001 0.052 0.097 -0.220 1.305 0.564 0.865 126
t-2 to t-12 Momentum (0.43) (0.74) (1.09) (-3.07) (26.70) 0.141
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Table XI: Fama MacBeth Return Regressions (High versus Low Mutual Fund Common Ownership of Linked Peers)
Fama-MacBeth regressions with the monthly stock return as the dependent variable. A key variable we use to subsample the data is mutual fund common ownership, which is based
on Cohen and Frazzini (2008). We first compute this quantity at the level of linked economic peers. The fraction of common ownership for a given peer is equal to the number of
mutual funds that hold both the focal firm and the peer firm in the given pair divided by the number of mutual funds that own the peer firm (when no funds own the peer, this is set
to zero). Hence this number is bounded in the interval [0,1]. We then compute the average of this quantity over each firm’s TNIC rivals to obtain a direct measure of joint ownership of
a given focal firm’s TNIC industry. Firms with high common ownership are in industries where there is likely a high level of attention to economic shocks that might affect the pairs of
firms in the TNIC industry. Hence, anomalies that require low attention should not exist when there is a high level of joint ownership. As noted in the first column, we run the stock
return regressions for subsamples based on quintiles of mutual fund joint ownership, where quintiles are formed separately in each month. Our mutual fund ownership metrics are
based on the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free US Mutual Fund database. We limit attention to diversified equity funds (our goal is to exclude non-actively managed index funds) by following
the sequential data selection algorithm used in Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2007). The independent variables are all measured ex-ante using the lag structure given by Fama and
French. The key variables include 10-K Based TNIC-3 momentum. We consider the entire sample (Panel A) and the sample that ends prior to the 2008-2009 crisis period (Panel B).
All RHS variables are standardized prior to running the regression for ease of comparison. All standard errors are adjusted using Newey-West with two lags.
t-2 to t-12 t-1
TNIC-3 TNIC-3 Log Market Log Book
Industry Industry Capital- to Market # Months/
Row Sample Past Return Past Return ization Ratio R2 # Obs.
Panel A: All Months 7/97 to 12/12
(1) Less Jointly Owned 0.010 0.010 -0.002 0.003 0.032 186
(4.30) (7.50) (-0.92) (3.22) 889
(2) Quintile 2 0.006 0.006 -0.001 0.002 0.050 186
(2.26) (4.41) (-0.33) (2.04) 864
(3) Quintile 3 0.005 0.008 -0.001 0.001 0.042 186
(1.82) (5.52) (-0.61) (0.77) 877
(4) Quintile 4 0.004 0.008 -0.001 0.001 0.041 186
(1.87) (5.32) (-0.99) (1.05) 877
(5) More Jointly Owned 0.002 0.008 -0.002 0.000 0.046 186
(0.64) (5.61) (-1.57) (0.03) 877
Panel B: Pre-Crisis Months 7/97 to 12/07
(6) Less Jointly Owned 0.012 0.011 -0.003 0.004 0.035 126
(4.31) (6.96) (-1.53) (2.65) 970
(7) Quintile 2 0.008 0.008 -0.001 0.002 0.058 126
(2.99) (4.36) (-0.62) (1.89) 933
(8) Quintile 3 0.006 0.011 -0.001 0.002 0.048 126
(2.45) (5.75) (-0.71) (0.96) 952
(9) Quintile 4 0.007 0.009 -0.002 0.001 0.047 126
(3.08) (5.04) (-1.08) (0.89) 952
(10) More Jointly Owned 0.005 0.009 -0.003 0.001 0.050 126
(1.88) (5.45) (-1.58) (0.67) 951
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Table XII: Fama MacBeth Return Regressions (Long-Term Reversals)
Fama-MacBeth regressions with the monthly stock return as the dependent variable. Panels A and B consider momentum and reversal returns for our entire cross sectional sample in
the full sample and the pre 2008 sample. We then form quintiles of the data using the long-term return-differential between less visible TNIC industry peers and highly visible SIC
industry peers. In particular, we take the TNIC industry return during the past three year horizon (months t− 2 to t− 36), and divide by the SIC-3 industry return during the same
period. A high value indicates that less visible peer returns outpaced highly visible peer returns during the past three year window, indicating likely overreaction due to inattention to
this return differential. We sort firms into quintiles based on this ratio, and we form quintiles separately for each month. We then examine momentum and reversal return predictions
in each subsample in Panels B and C. The independent variables are all measured ex-ante using the lag structure given by Fama and French. Our primary variable of interest is the
TNIC past return from month t− 36 to t− 13, which relates to predicted reversals. We also consider the past 11 month TNIC return (skipping the most recent) as the benchmark
consistent with other studies, and we also separately consider the most recent month’s return. TNIC-3 momentum variables are based on the average past returns of rival firms in each
TNIC industry where the firm itself is excluded from the average. We also include controls for size and book to market. All RHS variables are standardized prior to running the
regression for ease of comparison. All standard errors are adjusted using Newey-West with two lags.
t-13 to t-36 t-2 to t-12 t-1
TNIC-3 TNIC-3 TNIC-3 Log Market Log Book
Industry Industry Industry Capital- to Market # Months/
Row Sample Past Return Past Return Past Return ization Ratio R2 # Obs.
Panel A: All Months 7/97 to 12/12
(1) Whole Sample -0.002 0.005 0.007 -0.001 0.002 0.038 186
(-1.44) (2.02) (6.33) (-0.60) (1.71) 713,888
Panel B: Pre-Crisis Months 7/97 to 12/07
(2) Pre 2008 -0.003 0.007 0.008 -0.002 0.002 0.044 126
(-2.27) (3.14) (6.05) (-0.94) (1.57) 516,453
Panel C: All Months 7/97 to 12/12
(3) Low Ratio 0.000 0.006 0.005 -0.001 0.002 0.029 186
(0.26) (3.61) (4.77) (-0.39) (2.32) 142,703
(4) Quintile 2 -0.003 0.003 0.006 -0.001 0.001 0.040 186
(-1.74) (1.35) (4.70) (-0.84) (0.65) 142,817
(5) Quintile 3 -0.000 0.001 0.009 -0.000 0.002 0.066 186
(-0.21) (0.26) (6.33) (-0.06) (2.07) 142,816
(6) Quintile 4 -0.003 0.006 0.011 -0.001 0.001 0.065 186
(-1.26) (1.70) (5.41) (-0.65) (1.52) 142,817
(7) High Ratio -0.005 0.004 0.007 -0.001 0.002 0.043 186
(-2.73) (1.55) (4.70) (-0.94) (1.76) 142,735
Panel D: Pre-Crisis Months 7/97 to 12/07
(8) Low Ratio 0.000 0.007 0.005 -0.001 0.002 0.031 126
(0.30) (4.19) (3.74) (-0.74) (1.89) 103,240
(9) Quintile 2 -0.002 0.006 0.008 -0.002 0.001 0.045 126
(-1.15) (2.87) (5.25) (-0.86) (0.66) 103,314
(10) Quintile 3 -0.002 0.006 0.009 -0.000 0.003 0.070 126
(-1.19) (2.28) (5.75) (-0.26) (2.27) 103,321
(11) Quintile 4 -0.004 0.009 0.013 -0.002 0.002 0.074 126
(-1.76) (2.97) (5.17) (-0.82) (1.83) 103,314
(12) High Ratio -0.004 0.007 0.010 -0.003 0.002 0.049 126
(-2.02) (2.54) (6.02) (-1.68) (1.14) 103,264
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Figure 1:
Arithmetic cumulative abnormal returns (HML, SMB, MKT adjusted) of zero-investment calendar time momentum portfolios based on varying
definitions of momentum. Calendar time portfolios are constructed by first sorting firms into quintiles in each month based on the given momentum
variables. We then compute equal weighted average returns of firms in the highest quintile, and subtract the equal weighted returns of firms in the lowest
quintile. The result is a zero investment portfolio capturing the return differential across the extreme quintiles. We then regress each portfolio on the 3
Fama and French factors, and compute the abnormal return as the intercept plus the residuals. The graph displays the arithmetically cumulated abnormal
returns over our sample. We consider own-firm momentum, SIC-3 based industry momentum, and 10-K based TNIC-3 industry momentum. Past returns
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Figure 2:
Arithmetic cumulative abnormal returns (HML, SMB, MKT, UMD adjusted) of zero-investment calendar time momentum portfolios based on varying
definitions of momentum. Calendar time portfolios are constructed by first sorting firms into quintiles in each month based on the given momentum
variables. We then compute equal weighted average returns of firms in the highest quintile, and subtract the equal weighted returns of firms in the lowest
quintile. The result is a zero investment portfolio capturing the return differential across the extreme quintiles. We then regress each portfolio on the 3
Fama and French factors and the UMD factor, and compute the abnormal return as the intercept plus the residuals. The graph displays the arithmetically
cumulated abnormal returns over our sample. We consider own-firm momentum, SIC-3 based industry momentum, and 10-K based TNIC-3 industry






















































































Online Appendix Table A1
Return Comovement: High and Low Industry Disparity
Fama-MacBeth regressions with own-firm monthly stock return as the dependent variable. One observation is one
firm from July 1997 to December 2012. The independent variable includes the SIC-based return benchmark
(excluding the firm itself) and the text-based return benchmark (also excluding the firm itself). We also include
controls for the ? variables (log book to market ratio and log size), a dummy for negative book to market ratio
stocks (the dummy is not displayed to conserve space and is not significant), and a control for momentum (defined
as the own-firm 11 month lagged return from month t− 12 to t− 2). Panels A and B display results for firms with
high TNIC/SIC disparity and low firm disparity, respectively. Disparity is one minus the total sales of firms in the
intersection of TNIC-3 and SIC-3 peers divided by the total sales of firms in the union of TNIC-3 and SIC-3 peers.
All peer variables are standardized to have a standard deviation of one for ease of comparison and interpretation.
All standard errors are adjusted using Newey-West with two lags.
Text-based SIC-3 Log Past
Dependent Peer Peer B/M Log 11 Mon. RSQ /
Row Variable Return Return Ratio Size Return # Obs.
Panel A: Above Median Industry Disparity
(1) Month t Returns 0.025 0.018 0.003 -0.000 0.001 0.051
(23.81) (25.21) (3.66) (-0.38) (0.54) 384,252
(2) Month t + 1 Returns 0.006 0.004 0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.031
(5.79) (4.01) (2.52) (-0.53) (0.27) 381,612
(3) Month t + 2 Returns 0.004 0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.030
(3.59) (2.46) (2.43) (-0.60) (-0.42) 378,937
(4) Month t + 3 Returns 0.004 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.028
(3.00) (1.55) (2.18) (-0.73) (-0.34) 376,247
Panel B: Below Median Industry Disparity
(5) Month t Returns 0.042 0.026 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.106
(44.05) (30.62) (2.52) (-0.66) (-0.44) 384,159
(6) Month t + 1 Returns 0.010 0.005 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.051
(5.51) (3.94) (1.17) (-0.72) (-0.49) 381,638
(7) Month t + 2 Returns 0.003 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.049
(1.67) (1.43) (1.19) (-0.73) (-0.75) 379,119
(8) Month t + 3 Returns 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.046
(0.97) (1.20) (0.73) (-0.81) (-0.50) 376,568
2
Online Appendix Table A2
Return Comovement (Systematic versus Idiosyncratic Components)
Fama-MacBeth regressions with own-firm monthly stock return as the dependent variable. One observation is one
firm from July 1997 to December 2012 (Panel A) and from July 1997 to December 2007 (Panel B). The
independent variables include the systematic and idiosyncratic portions of the text-based return benchmark. To
compute the systematic portion, we first regress (for each month) daily stock returns for each firm onto the three
Fama French factors and the momentum factor. The projection from this regression (excluding the projection from
the intercept) is the systematic portion of a firm’s daily return. These are then aggregated to monthly observations,
and we compute the average of these systematic returns over each firm’s text based peers to get the “Systematic
Peer Return”. The idiosyncratic Peer Return is the raw text-based peer return minus the systematic peer return.
Peer variables are standardized to have a standard deviation of one for ease of comparison and interpretation. All
standard errors are adjusted using Newey-West with two lags.
Systematic Idio. Log Past
Dependent Peer Peer B/M Log 11 Mon. RSQ /
Row Variable Return Return Ratio Size Return # Obs.
Panel A: All Firms
(1) Month t Returns 0.038 0.028 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.064
(27.08) (36.42) (2.72) (-0.47) (0.21) 811,672
(2) Month t + 1 Returns 0.009 0.007 0.002 -0.001 -0.000 0.038
(3.76) (6.51) (1.84) (-0.49) (-0.10) 802,811
(3) Month t + 2 Returns 0.003 0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.037
(0.92) (2.96) (1.77) (-0.60) (-0.53) 793,926
(4) Month t + 3 Returns -0.000 0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.036
(-0.07) (2.78) (1.48) (-0.63) (-0.52) 784,990
Panel B: Pre-Crisis Months 7/97 to 12/07
(5) Month t Returns 0.037 0.029 0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.068
(21.12) (28.43) (2.49) (-0.90) (1.84) 596,065
(6) Month t + 1 Returns 0.009 0.008 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.042
(3.22) (5.71) (1.65) (-0.95) (1.25) 591,690
(7) Month t + 2 Returns 0.002 0.004 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.041
(0.62) (2.75) (1.65) (-1.18) (1.13) 587,285
(8) Month t + 3 Returns -0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.039
(-0.79) (1.98) (1.39) (-1.05) (0.85) 582,833
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Online Appendix Table A3
Actual vs Random TNIC Industry Momentum Returns
The first two columns report average ex-post returns and the average past 11 month returns for deciles sorted
based on the past 11 month return. The past 11 month return is lagged one extra month and is thus measured
from month t = −12 to t = −2. The ex-post return is from month t = 0. Reported averages are the industry
average value of the past 11 month return and the ex-post return following the approach in Moskowitz and
Grinblatt (1997). The last two columns report the results of random industry portfolios also following the approach
in Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1997). In particular, we sort all firms by their past 11 month return, and replace each
firm in each industry with the other firm that had the closest 12 month return. This creates random industries of
similar size and granularity as TNIC, and each random industry had almost identical past returns as each actual
industry (as displayed below in the first and third data columns). Unlike the past returns, the ex-post returns are
not mechanistically linked in this way. The ex-post returns are thus the variable of interest. The table shows that
the upward pattern of ex-post returns for actual TNIC peer returns is significantly steeper than the trend for
random TNIC peer returns. A statistical test of differences indicates that these patterns are statistically different
at the 1% level. Hence, actual horizontal industry links are critical in generating our observed results.
Actual TNIC Actual TNIC Random TNIC Random TNIC
t-2 to t-12 t=0 ex- t-2 to t-12 t=0 ex-
Decile Past Return post Return Past Return post Return
Lowest Past Return -25.50 0.65 -25.52 1.08
2 -12.71 0.87 -12.75 0.99
3 -6.24 1.12 -6.29 0.92
4 0.09 0.95 0.03 0.90
5 6.05 0.88 5.99 0.91
6 12.17 1.01 12.09 0.97
7 19.91 1.39 19.80 1.09
8 29.57 1.77 29.41 1.18
9 41.51 1.85 41.19 1.19
Highest Past Return 71.89 1.92 70.54 1.20
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Online Appendix Table A4
Fama MacBeth Return Regressions (Robustness to Large-to-Small Firm Lead-Lag)
To examine if our results can be explained by the well-known lead-lag effect between large and small firms as shown in ?, we consider several increasingly stringent specifications and
examine if our key one-year TNIC momentum variable remains significant. For convenience, Panel A displays our baseline results in Table VI of the main paper with no modifications
and displays Fama-MacBeth regressions with the monthly stock return as the dependent variable. The tests in Panel B are identical to those in Panel A except we use Fama-French-12
industry returns (as in Hou (2007)) instead of SIC-3 based returns as a control in the columns labeled “SIC-based Industry Past Return”. We note that the Fama French industry
definitions are indeed based on SIC codes, and hence we do not change the label and simply note the change here. The tests in Panel C are identical to those in Panel B except that we
compute past SIC-based returns only using firms with above median lagged market capitalizations in each month. This more rigidly controls for the lead-lag effect, as Hou (2007)
shows that larger firms lead the returns of smaller firms and not vice-a-versa. The tests in Panel D are identical to those in Panel B except that we reduce the sample in the final
Fama-MacBeth regression to only include firms with above median lagged market capitalizations in each month. The tests in Panel E are identical to those in Panel D except that we
only include the firms in the highest tercile of lagged market capitalization instead of using the median as the threshold. These latter two tests are particularly stringent and illustrate
that our results cannot be explained by the well-known lead-lag effect because returns attributable to the lead-lag effect do not exist in samples of larger firms. Because our results are
robust to all of these specifications, and also because we find long-lasting predictable returns (12 months), we conclude that our results are related to the momentum anomaly and not
to the lead-lag anomaly. All RHS variables are standardized prior to running the regression for ease of comparison. All standard errors are adjusted using Newey-West with two lags.
t-2 to t-12 t-2 to t-12 t-1 t-1
t-2 to t-12 TNIC-3 SIC-based t-1 TNIC-3 SIC-based Log Market Log Book
Own Firm Industry Industry Own Firm Industry Industry Capital- to Market # Months/
Row Sample Past Return Past Return Past Return Past Return Past Return Past Return ization Ratio R2 # Obs.
Panel A: Baseline Results
(1) All Months -0.000 0.006 -0.000 -0.006 0.008 0.005 -0.000 0.002 0.050 186
(-0.07) (4.36) (-0.30) (-5.92) (8.82) (5.96) (-0.37) (2.32) 811,672
(2) Pre-2008 0.002 0.007 0.000 -0.006 0.009 0.005 -0.001 0.003 0.054 126
(1.44) (4.27) (0.04) (-4.71) (8.14) (5.53) (-0.77) (2.22) 596,065
Panel B: Same as Panel A but Replace Fama-French-12 industries instead of SIC-3 industries
(3) All Months -0.000 0.007 -0.005 -0.006 0.008 0.012 -0.000 0.002 0.054 186
(-0.14) (4.88) (-1.84) (-5.90) (9.33) (4.02) (-0.31) (2.82) 819,314
(4) Pre-2008 0.002 0.008 -0.003 -0.006 0.009 0.015 -0.001 0.003 0.059 126
(1.33) (4.57) (-1.26) (-4.72) (8.25) (4.49) (-0.74) (2.56) 601,956
Panel C: Same as panel B, but only include larger firms in SIC-based controls
(5) All Months -0.000 0.006 -0.001 -0.006 0.008 0.011 -0.000 0.002 0.055 186
(-0.18) (4.15) (-0.47) (-5.78) (9.22) (4.22) (-0.37) (2.54) 819,314
(6) Pre-2008 0.002 0.007 0.000 -0.006 0.009 0.013 -0.001 0.003 0.059 126
(1.28) (4.19) (0.00) (-4.60) (8.16) (4.34) (-0.76) (2.46) 601,956
Panel D: Same as panel C, but only include firms with above median size in sample
(7) All Months -0.001 0.003 -0.005 -0.004 0.006 0.006 -0.001 0.001 0.083 186
(-0.43) (2.75) (-2.06) (-4.21) (6.22) (1.98) (-0.62) (1.45) 409,659
(8) Pre-2008 0.001 0.004 -0.003 -0.005 0.007 0.010 -0.000 0.001 0.087 126
(0.29) (2.92) (-1.15) (-3.88) (6.24) (2.79) (-0.10) (1.38) 300,983
Panel E: Same as panel D, but only include larger tercile firms in sample
(9) All Months -0.002 0.003 -0.004 -0.003 0.005 0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.099 186
(-0.57) (2.82) (-1.73) (-3.34) (4.98) (1.29) (-1.43) (0.66) 273,109
(10) Pre-2008 0.001 0.004 -0.002 -0.004 0.006 0.007 -0.001 0.001 0.106 126
(0.28) (3.11) (-0.88) (-3.01) (5.07) (1.98) (-0.65) (0.97) 200,649
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Online Appendix Table A5
Fama MacBeth Return Regressions (separately consider positive and negative past returns)
This table is identical to Table VI in the main paper with the following changes: first, we replace SIC-3 momentum variables with momentum variables based on the Fama-French 12
industries. Second, we divide all momentum variables into their positive and negative components. This is done by defining the positive component as being equal to the past return
itself if it is positive, and zero otherwise. The negative component is similarly defined. This change is considered to show that our results are robust to this alternative specification
that is motivated by Hou (2007), who shows that the negative component of past returns is more significant than the positive component when explaining the lead-lag anomaly. Our
goal is to explain industry momentum, and indeed our results below show that the positive component of past returns is more important than the negative component.
POSITIVE COMPONENTS NEGATIVE COMPONENTS
t-2 to t-12 t-2 to t-12 t-1 t-1 t-2 to t-12 t-2 to t-12 t-1 t-1
t-2 to t-12 TNIC-3 SIC-3 t-1 TNIC-3 SIC-3 t-2 to t-12 TNIC-3 SIC-3 t-1 TNIC-3 SIC-3
Self Industry Industry Self Industry Industry Self Industry Industry Self Industry Industry Mnths
RowSample Past Ret Past Ret Past Ret Past Ret Past Ret Past Ret Past Ret Past Ret Past Ret Past Ret Past Ret Past Ret R2 # Obs
Panel A: All Months 7/97 to 12/12
(1) All Months 0.003 -0.002 0.004 -0.003 0.049 186
(2.30) (-2.44) (2.04) (-2.95) 819,314
(2) All Months 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.039 186
(3.27) (3.57) (1.93) (5.28) 819,314
(3) All Months 0.241 -0.085 -0.201 0.141 0.038 186
(1.04) (-0.73) (-1.12) (0.86) 819,314
(4) All Months 0.003 0.141 -0.002 -0.068 0.003 -0.188 -0.003 0.102 0.063 186
(2.21) (1.06) (-3.82) (-0.69) (2.02) (-1.09) (-3.35) (0.63) 819,314
(5) All Months 0.002 0.005 0.145 -0.003 0.003 -0.068 0.002 0.002 -0.196 -0.004 0.005 0.092 0.069 186
(1.62) (3.54) (1.03) (-5.17) (4.32) (-0.71) (1.50) (2.70) (-1.10) (-4.06) (6.95) (0.60) 819,314
Panel B: Pre-Crisis Months 7/97 to 12/07
(6) Pre-2008 0.005 -0.002 0.004 -0.003 0.052 126
(3.15) (-1.71) (2.20) (-2.18) 601,956
(7) Pre-2008 0.009 0.005 0.002 0.006 0.046 126
(4.59) (3.68) (1.22) (5.97) 601,956
(8) Pre-2008 0.011 -0.129 -0.012 0.012 0.043 126
(2.26) (-0.76) (-0.68) (0.59) 601,956
(9) Pre-2008 0.004 0.010 -0.002 -0.103 0.004 -0.006 -0.003 -0.032 0.066 126
(2.94) (2.11) (-2.73) (-0.72) (2.33) (-0.43) (-2.54) (-0.69) 601,956
(10) Pre-2008 0.003 0.007 0.005 -0.003 0.004 -0.102 0.003 0.002 -0.008 -0.004 0.006 -0.038 0.074 126
(2.25) (4.68) (1.08) (-3.87) (4.00) (-0.73) (1.85) (1.71) (-0.53) (-3.20) (8.04) (-0.75) 601,956
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